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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters on topics in public economics. In the first chapter, I study the
conflict over the provision of multiple public goods in U.S. cities. I use a rich dataset of municipal spending
and Census micro-data to provide evidence that different demographic groups do indeed have conflicting
preferences over the composition of public goods and services provided at the local level. To account for
endogeneity due to sorting I use a simulated instrumental variable approach where I simulate the
demographic distribution in each city that would have occurred if each city's demographic composition had
evolved in the same way as in the national level. I then propose a model that can accommodate multiple
groups with conflicting preferences over each public good provided and different income distributions within
groups and I estimate it using GMM. Using the estimated model, I use the projected evolution of each
demographic group to generate predictions on the supply of different public goods in each city. I find that, if
the current demographic trends continue, by 2030 there will an average decrease in the provision of public
education in U.S. cities of 2%, an average increase in basic public goods and redistributive spending of 20%,
with substantial variability across cities. In the second chapter, I propose a new model of how the level and
composition of public services are determined in a city. The model allows for an arbitrary number of groups
with different preferences over public goods and within-group income heterogeneity. I embed the political
economy model of public good provision in the city into a location choice model between the central city and
the suburbs in order to study the interactions between mobility and the political conflict over the composition
of the budget. Through a numerical exercise I show that mobility and demographic conflict interact in a
surprising way, generating a non-monotonic effect between increasing demographic heterogeneity and the
size of the public sector. When heterogeneity is low, increasing it reduces the size of the public sector, but it
also alters the demographic composition of the city as richer individuals of the minority group leave for the
suburbs and the richer individuals from the majority move from the suburbs to the city. This leads to a more
homogeneous city and to an inflection in the support for public spending. Eventually, increases in taste
heterogeneity lead to increases in public spending per capita, and to a starker segregation between city and
suburbs.
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Jesús Fernandez-Villaverde, Professor of Economics
Dissertation Committee:
Holger Sieg, J. M. Cohen Term Chair in Economics
Gilles Duranton, Dean’s Chair in Real Estate Professor at Wharton
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS
Pau Pereira
Holger Sieg
This dissertation consists of two chapters on topics in public economics. In the
first chapter, I study the conflict over the provision of multiple public goods in U.S.
cities. I use a rich data set of municipal spending and Census micro-data to provide
evidence that different demographic groups do indeed have conflicting preferences
over the composition of public goods and services provided at the local level. To
account for endogeneity due to sorting I use a simulated instrumental variable ap-
proach where I simulate the demographic distribution in each city that would have
occurred if each city’s demographic composition had evolved in the same way as in
the national level. I then propose a model that can accommodate multiple groups
with conflicting preferences over each public good provided and different income dis-
tributions within groups and I estimate it using GMM. Using the estimated model, I
use the projected evolution of each demographic group to generate predictions on the
supply of different public goods in each city. I find that, if the current demographic
trends continue, by 2030 there will an average decrease in the provision of public
v
education in U.S. cities of 2%, an average increase in basic public goods and redis-
tributive spending of 20%, with substantial variability across cities. In the second
chapter, I propose a new model of how the level and composition of public services
are determined in a city. The model allows for an arbitrary number of groups with
different preferences over public goods and within group income heterogeneity. I
embed the political economy model of public good provision in the city into a lo-
cation choice model between the central city and the suburbs in order to study the
interactions between mobility and the political conflict over the composition of the
budget. Through a numerical exercise I show that mobility and demographic conflict
interact in a surprising way, generating a non-monotonic effect between increasing
demographic heterogeneity and the size of the public sector. When heterogeneity is
low, increasing it reduces the size of the public sector, but it also alters the demo-
graphic composition of the city as richer individuals of the minority group leave for
the suburbs and the richer individuals from the majority move from the suburbs to
the city. This leads to a more homogeneous city and to an inflection in the support
for public spending. Eventually, increases in taste heterogeneity lead to increases in
public spending per capita, and to a starker segregation between city and suburbs.
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When individuals have different ideas over how to spend public money they are re-
luctant to contribute with their tax dollars to the public budget. Cities are home
to a very diverse constituency—demographically, economically and in terms of val-
ues and opinions—yet they rely on the city’s government to provide many essential
public goods and services—like public school funding, police and fire protection,
public transportation, sanitation and public welfare among many others. The pub-
lic economics literature has produced a considerable amount of evidence supporting
this hypothesis. Not much attention—though—has been payed to how this political
conflict can be explained by having preferences over different public goods. This
dissertation provides methods to model the conflict in the provision of multiple pub-
lic goods. It consists of two chapters. The first one is an empirical examination of
1
how demographic conflict over the provision of different public goods and services in
U.S. cities. The second chapter develops a theoretical model of how conflict over the
provision of public goods and city-suburb mobility play out.
In chapter 2, I look at the conflict in the provision of multiple public goods in
large U.S. cities. Using a rich dataset on local spending by large cities and suburban
municipalities merged with Census micro data, I develop an instrumental variables
strategy using simulated instruments to determine the sources of conflict in the pro-
vision of public goods. I focus on the provision of three public good aggregates that
encompass the vast majority of public goods provided by cities: public education,
basic public goods (police, fire, transportation, etc.) and redistributive public goods
(public welfare, public hospitals, etc.). I also build and structurally estimate a model
of the determination and distribution of local public goods in large cities that takes
into account heterogeneity of preferences across demographic groups. I estimate
the model with GMM and use the estimated model to generate predictions. I find
that there is a political conflict between households with children, young households
without children and older empty nesters in the provision of public education, basic
public goods and redistribution. I also find that if the current demographic trends
continue there will be, by 2030, an average decrease in the provision of public ed-
ucation in U.S. cities of 18%, an average increase in basic public goods of 3% and
2
average redistribution will remain the same, with substantial variability across cities.
In chapter 3, I propose a new model of how the level and composition of pub-
lic services are determined in a city. The model allows for an arbitrary number of
groups with different preferences over public goods and within group income het-
erogeneity. I embed the political economy model of public good provision in the
city into a location choice model between the central city and the suburbs in order
to study the interactions between mobility and the political conflict over the com-
position of the budget. Solving the model numerically, I show that mobility and
demographic conflict interact in a surprising way, generating a non-monotonic ef-
fect between increasing demographic heterogeneity and the size of the public sector.
When heterogeneity is low, increasing it reduces the size of the public sector, but
it also alters the demographic composition of the city as richer individuals of the
minority group leave for the suburbs and the richer individuals from the majority
move from the suburbs to the city. This leads to a more homogeneous city and to an
inflexion in the support for public spending. Eventually, increases in taste hetero-
geneity lead to increases in public spending per capita, and to a starker segregation
between city and suburbs.
3
Chapter 2
An Empirical Analysis of the Conflict in the Pro-
vision of Public Goods in U.S. Cities
2.1 Motivation
Not everyone values the services a city provides in equal measure, nor are all residents
equally willing to contribute to the public funds. By and large, the value households
assign to different public goods depends on their income and their demographics.
Young couples with children may value the availability of good schools, the poor
may want good public transportation and welfare programs like subsidized housing,
the elderly more police protection and nursing homes, and so on. The scarcity of
resources and the logic of the democratic process will pit one group against another
in the competition for shares of the public budget. Almost everybody will have to
4
settle for a public good level and composition different from their preferred one.
Cities are home to a very diverse constituency, both in therms of their ethnicity,
skill, age and income. Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny [2014] show that urban
income distributions are characterized by fat tails. Furthermore, the demographic
structure of American cities has been changing rapidly over the last years, as young
families with children move to the suburbs and an increasing share of empty nesters
from the baby boom generation move into the central cities. Understanding how
the provision of local public services is affected by the demographic structure and
institutional characteristics of cities is important for a number of reasons. First, an
increasing share of the world population lives in cities. In the US, the 25 largest
central cities are home to 12% of the total population, when we look at the 25 larges
metropolitan areas, the share is 42%. Second, more diverse communities may be
less willing to contribute to the provision of essential public services to its residents.
The evidence on this fact is mixed, and little is known on the mechanisms that
link demographic heterogeneity and the provision of public goods. Third, in many
parts of the world, and in the US in particular, local governments carry much of the
responsibility in the provision of public goods. For example, in 2008 one-eight of
total US GDP was spent by local governments, which corresponds to one-fourth of
total government spending, and employed over 14 million people (Glaeser [2012]).
5
A useful model of the political economy of central cities should incorporate the
following two features, which are present in all large American cities. First, cities
provide a wide range of public goods and services (education, police and fire pro-
tection, health services, housing assistance, waste management, roads, parks,etc.)
which are mostly funded at the local level. Second, large cities are home to a very
diverse constituency - poor and rich, elderly and young, families and empty nester’s-
all of which benefit from different public goods in different ways.
Incorporating this features into a tractable empirical model is challenging for
several reasons. For example, allowing local governments to provide multiple goods,
and having different types of voters means that we can not use the median voter
result to map voter’s preferences into public policies. The simplicity and tractability
of the median voter model has made it the workhorse model in the study of the
political economy of local jurisdictions (Epple, Romano, and Sieg [2012]). 1
In this chapter, I look at the conflict in the provision of public goods in large
American cities. Previous studies have shown that a larger share of elderly voters has
a depressing effect on public education spending per capita (Poterba [1997], Tosun,
Williamson, and Yakovlev [2009] and Figlio and Fletcher [2012]). Previous studies
have typically focused on the provision of single good. In contrast, I look at the
1The fact that the median voter model is ill-suited for the econometric analysis of large city
budgeting has also been noted by Inman [1978].
6
effect of the demographic structure of a city on the levels and distribution of multiple
public goods. Studying the provision of multiple public goods—instead of focusing
on a single one—is important since the political conflict between demographic groups
is really about different preferences over baskets of public goods. Doing so allows me
to unravel the real political friction points between different groups.
Using micro samples from the Census and Census of Governments data, I provide
evidence of the conflict between demographic groups. To deal with the potential
bias resulting from sorting between different municipalities (Tiebout bias), I use a
simulated instruments approach that uses the nation wide patterns of growth of each
demographic group to predict the demographic shares in each city and year, using as
the base level the population levels observed in 1970, which are taken to be exogenous
of the sorting forces during the rest of the sample. A similar strategy has been used
by Boustan, Ferreira, Winkler, and Zolt [2013] in their study of the effect of income
inequality on the provision of public education in school districts.
I also propose an empirical model of how the level and composition of public
services are determined in a city inhabited by people from different demographic
groups - hence with different preferences over how to split the public budget - and
with different incomes. Public policy is then decided through a democratic process
that aggregates all these preferences. I model this process by assuming that two
7
candidates are competing for the mayoral office by proposing feasible combinations
of public goods and taxes. To guarantee that a political equilibrium exists, I borrow
from the probabilistic voting theory by assuming that candidates have incomplete
information about voters’ preferences and maximize the expected number of votes
(Lindbeck and Weibull [1987], Dixit and Londregan [1996, 1998]). I estimate the
model with a multi-equation nonlinear GMM approach using moments derived from
the first order conditions of the model.
I find that households with children value public education the most, but have a
very low valuation of basic public goods and redistribution spending. Young house-
holds without children also have a great value for public education, but this is dom-
inated by their preference for basic public goods. Older households without children
value public education the least, and have a strong preference for basic public goods
and redistributive spending.
Using the past decade’s growth rates of each group I project the population
levels of each group to the year 2030. Using the estimated model to compute the
distribution of public goods in each city, I find that in most cities demand for public
education will decrease substantially whereas demand for basic and redistributive
public goods will increase, although there are large discrepancies across cities. This
can have potentially large welfare effects across different demographic groups, with
8
the worst hit being poor households with children who are stuck in cities where the
political equilibrium is shifting away from public education.
The structure of the chapter is the following. 2.2 offers a literature review on the
political economy of public good provision. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 explain the data
used in the estimation and the stylized facts that come out of it. In section 2.5
I develop the model and describe its equilibrium. In section 2.6 I discuss how to
estimate the model. In section 2.8 I use the estimated model to predict the evolution
of the demand for the different public goods.
2.2 Literature Review
This chapter contributes to several strands of the literature—both empirical and
theoretical. It fills an important gap in the literature studying the provision of
local public goods by developing an empirical model that allows for the provision of
multiple public goods to heterogeneous constituencies, thus providing an alternative
to the median voter model in the study of local public finance. In the next section
I review the different literatures that have studied public good provision by local
governments. For each one, I highlight the common ground with this chapter as well
as the differences.
The study of the political economy of public good provision by local governments
9
has a long history in economics. Economists have made a number of assumptions
about the mechanisms transforming the preferences of the electorate to the policies
enacted. In most cases this takes the form of a model of voting by the residents
of the local jurisdiction. Residents can vote directly on the policy to be enacted—
e.g. how much to spend on public education—or indirectly through representatives.
Perhaps the most commonly employed political model in studying local governments
is the simple median voter model. In this model it is normally assumed that voters
disagree on the policy based on their income. It has long been established—first by
Black [1948] and later by Downs [1957]—that when voters decide over a single policy,
single-peaked preferences are sufficient to guarantee that a decisive voter exists, also
known as Condorcet equilibrium. With the additional assumptions that voters vote
sincerely and that the enacted policy will be one that cannot be defeated under
majority rule by any other policy, the median voter model predicts that the enacted
policy will be the most preferred by the voter with median income. Bergstrom and
Goodman [1973] provide the first successful attempt to turn the median voter model
into a logically consistent demand equation suitable for empirical analysis. Using
their approach, Inman [1978] tests the empirical validity of the median voter model
by looking at public school spending decisions in a sample of fifty-eight Long Island
school districts. He finds that his sample of Long Island schools do indeed behave as
10
if the median voter is deciding their level of spending. Inspired by this result, a large
number of public economists set out to apply the median voter model to a number of
public good provision problems. The support for the median voter hypothesis coming
out of these studies is mixed, as reported in Romer and Rosenthal [1979]. While the
data shows a relation between the income of the median voter and the level of public
expenditures it is unclear whether that level of spending is the preferred level of the
median voter or some multiple of it. This is sometimes called ”the multiple fallacy”.
An additional shortcoming of this literature is that it ignores the effect of migration
across communities, as pointed out by Goldstein and Pauly [1981].
The fact that voters will choose where to live partly based on the different levels
of public goods offered by different jurisdictions adds further constraints to the pub-
lic policies that can be implemented by local governments. Failing to take mobility
into account can lead to biases due to sample selection, also known as “Tiebout
bias”. Inter-jurisdictional equilibrium models take into account that households are
mobile and choose among a set of communities based on their public goods, tax
rates and housing market conditions. Voters with similar tastes will tend to live
together, leading to communities being ranked by the income of its residents. This
literature has its origins in the seminal paper by Tiebout [1956]. Bergstrom, Ru-
binfeld, and Shapiro [1982] and Goldstein and Pauly [1981] use a control function
11
approach to correct for the Tiebout bias, avoiding the need to specify a full equilib-
rium model. More recently, there has been an effort to work out a theory of public
good provision that integrates mobility, housing markets and majority voting in a
general equilibrium framework. The theory for this models is developed in Epple
and Romer [1991]. Epple and Sieg [1999] provide the first empirical application of
an inter-jurisdictional equilibrium model; using data from the 1980 Census for 92
municipalities of the Boston Metropolitan Area they estimate a general equilibrium
model where the demographic distribution of each municipality, spending on public
schools and housing markets are endogenously determined. The key empirical test
is whether the model can match the observed income distributions in the sampled
municipalities. They find that the model does indeed match several moments of
the observed income distributions along with housing prices and school expenditure
levels. The methodology developed by Epple and Sieg [1999] has been applied to
many different contexts, from evaluations of public policies like the Clean Air Act
(Sieg, Smith, Banzhaf, and Walsh [2004]) to measuring the inefficiencies of fiscal de-
centralization (Calabrese, Epple, and Romano [2011]). This chapter borrows much
of the economic structure developed by this literature, but it does not attempt to
model the sorting of households across communities. This literature has dealt almost
exclusively with small, relatively homogeneous communities. This chapter focuses
12
on large cities with heterogeneous households along multiple dimensions. While it
is reasonable to assume that households in small communities care mainly about
the provision of a single good, namely public schools, this is not true for households
living in large cities. Finally, I allow households to have distinct preferences for each
public good so that the political conflict is about the composition of the bundle of
public goods, not only about the level of provision.
This chapter is also related to the literature studying the relationship between
ethnic conflict and measures of urban development like population growth and public
good provision. Several empirical papers using data from U.S. cities have found
that population growth is lower in cities with a larger fraction of nonwhite residents
(Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer [1995], Glaeser and Cutler [1995], Poterba [1997],
Luttmer [2001] and Goldin and Katz [1998]). A possible explanation is provided by
Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly [1999], which looks at the question of whether higher
ethnic fragmentation leads to lower public spending in public goods. They find a
strong and robust negative correlation between the level of ethnic fragmentation and
the provision of public goods in US cities and counties. In their model, voters differ
in their taste for quality, and must decide the quality and quantity of a single public
good. In more diverse communities, the chosen quality of the public good is farther
away from the preference of the median voter, which leads her to prefer a lower
13
level of public good provision. The main prediction of their model is that higher
fractionalization leads to lower provision of publics goods. They test this prediction
looking at county, city and metropolitan area data in the US and find that this is
actually the case. In my regression analysis I also find that ethnic fragmentation is
negatively associated with the provision of public education and basic public goods,
but has a positive correlation with redistribution. Even though this chapter does
not focus on ethnic conflict, the methodology that I develop could easily be applied
to these problems, providing a structural extension of their work. Doing so would
also relax some of the assumptions in Alesina et al. [1999], such as the restriction to
a single public good, and no income differences within demographic groups.
In a related paper, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly [2000] explore how local politi-
cians can use local public employment as a tool to redistribute resources to interest
groups. They find that public employment is significantly higher in cities with higher
ethnic and income inequality. To motivate their findings they use a model of gov-
ernment as in Coate and Morris [1995]. Rugh and Trounstine [2011] use historical
data from the turn of the twentieth century to the Second World War to show how
different ethnic compositions affected public spending in US cities. They finds that
South and Eastern Europeans depressed public spending, whereas black, Latino and
Asian populations affected it positively. They argue that these differences stem from
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the differences in voting rights among people from different ethnicities, so that in the
end it is heterogeneity at the voting booth that depresses public spending. Rugh and
Trounstine [2011] study the effects of ethnic diversity on the outcomes of municipal
bond elections. They find that more diverse cities hold fewer bond elections. But
they also find that the probability that a bond will be approved on election day and
the average size of the bonds is higher in more diverse cities. They interpret this as
evidence of strategic behavior by local politicians.
Ethnic fragmentation is not the only source of political conflict affecting the pro-
vision of public goods in cities. Boustan et al. [2013] look at the question of whether
the observed increase in income inequality over the past decades had a causal effect
on the provision of public school spending in a large set of small U.S. municipalities.
To account for possible sources of reverse causality—richer voters moving to dis-
tricts with higher levels of public school spending—they use a simulated instruments
strategy. In particular, they look at the observed Gini coefficients of each of their
municipalities in 1970—prior to the start of their sample—and project them using
the observed aggregate growth at the national level. This simulated Gini coefficients
are correlated with the observed ones, but are unlikely to be correlated with local
changes in revenues or expenditures. They find that increasing income inequality
causes public spending to go up, and it increases the shares of the budget devoted to
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police, fire protection and road maintenance. This chapter uses a similar technique
to generate instruments for the demographic composition of each city. In my model,
income inequality affects outcomes in two ways. First, by potentially changing the
average income, with higher expenditure levels if average income increases. Second,
by changing the relative average incomes of each demographic group. Local politi-
cian’s will weight each group’s preferences according to how sensitive each group is
to a marginal increase in taxation. With proportional taxes, higher income groups
will bear a larger burden and will be less likely to favor policies away from their
preferences. The equilibrium outcome, thus, gives more weight to richer groups.
Poterba [1997] looks at the intergenerational conflict in the provision of public
education. He first establishes that—theoretically—the correlation between the share
of older residents and support for public education could go either way. On one
hand, older residents may not have any direct use of public schools anymore, but
on the other hand public education has some positive externalities, both in terms
of crime and property values. From a median-voter perspective, whether changes
in the demographic structure will lead to changes in public spending depends on
whether the identity of the median voter is altered. In my model, changes from
demographic structure will translate into changes in the political equilibrium in a
more direct way, since the political equilibrium balances the preferences from the
16
different demographic groups in the city through an electoral competition game.
More recent evidence of intergenerational conflict in providing public goods also
point to there being an opposition to increasing expenditures by older voters. Harris,
Evans, and Schwab [2001] use data from school districts and control for endogeneity
in the demographic shares by using the past share of households from a previous
generation that stayed in the district. So, for example, they instrument the share
of those older than 65 by the share of those aged 55 to 65 in the previous decade,
subtracting those who left the district during that time. Farnham and Sevak [2006]
show that households have a tendency to sort according to empty nest status, and
that that tendency decreases when fiscal equalization laws are passed. Fletcher and
Kenny [2008] find opposition by older households when estimating public school
demand equations. Brunner and Ross [2010] use evidence from referendums in Cal-
ifornia and show that the elderly oppose increases in spending on public schools.
Reback [2015] looks at whether tax-price reductions offered to the elderly—which
reduce the burden of increased public good provision—decrease their opposition to
public school spending, and finds that that is indeed the case.
Epple et al. [2012] take a different approach; they develop an overlapping gen-
erations model embedded within a multi-jurisdictional sorting model, as in Epple
and Sieg [1999]. Their question is whether stratification by age, along with stratifi-
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cation by income, can explain some of the observed inequalities in school spending
across communities. They calibrate the model using data from municipalities in the
Boston Metropolitan Area. They find that in equilibrium, households that move
when children move out tend to be richer than average. This creates a positive fiscal
externality to the communities they move to that can overcome the negative effects
from their low political preference for school spending.
Craig, Kohlhase, Austin, and Botello [2014] look at why big cities spend a sig-
nificant fraction of their budget on income redistribution. They conclude that big
cities are able to raise taxes for income redistribution because they exploit significant
rents. To do that, they test whether big cities respond to innovations in suburban
expenditures. Under the hypothesis that big cities are not rent seeking and are max-
imizing the welfare of their citizens, we should expect that they do not respond to
such innovations.
As mentioned earlier, the most common political model to study the supply
of public goods is the median voter model. This model is useful as long as the
heterogeneity of voters is unidimensional—like income inequality. If the preferences
of voters being such that their preferred levels of public good provision are single-
peaked, then existence of a political equilibrium is guaranteed. When new forms of
voter heterogeneity are introduced, or when the policy space is multidimensional,
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we can no longer meaningfully rank the preferences of voters along their sources of
heterogeneity. As a result, a political equilibrium with majority voting does not exist
anymore.
The applied political economy literature has taken several different paths to deal
with this ”course of dimensionality”. One approach is to add some structure into the
voting process by forcing the votes to be unidimensional by having voters compare
different options one dimension at a time—voting on school spending first, police
spending second, and so on. This comes in two flavors. Voting can be sequential—
Stackelberg voting—or it can be simultaneous (Shepsle [1979b]). An example of
Stackelberg voting is given by Nechyba [1997]. In his model voters vote on the feder-
ally provided public good first, and on the locally provided good second. Additional
examples are given by Alesina et al. [1999] and Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby [2004]
where households vote on the quality of the public good first, and on the quantity
provided second. A drawback of Stackelberg voting is that the order in which the
different votes are scheduled will matter for the final outcome. This may not be
desirable in some applications, like when voting over multiple public goods provided
by the same level of government.
An interesting approach is taken by Caplin and Nalebuff [1991]. They propose
a set of restrictions on the density of voters—a new aggregation technique—that
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guarantee that the mean voter is decisive under a 64% majority rule. Their aggrega-
tion technique comes from an application of the mathematical aggregation theorem
proposed by Prekopa and Borell. I am not aware of any applications of their method
to the problem of local public good provision.
The fundamental issue with the non-existence of equilibrium with multidimen-
sional models is that the payoff functions of the candidates are not smooth. Small
deviations in their electoral proposals can create large swings in voter’s behavior.
The probabilistic voting literature addresses this issue by adding enough hetero-
geneity into the voter’s preferences so as to smooth the candidate’s payoff func-
tions. The basic assumption is probabilistic voting models is that voters care about
their consumption and, in addition, about other outcome that are not related to
consumption—normally this is the identity of the candidate. It is assumed, in addi-
tion, that candidates have imperfect information about voters preferences—they can
only observe the part of utility that depends on consumption and treat the other
component as a random variable. Consequently, they cannot perfectly predict their
share of the electorate when making electoral promises, and will therefore maximize
their expected share of votes. Under some mild concavity assumptions this is enough
to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, even with a multidimensional policy
space.
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The existence of pure strategy equilibriums in probabilistic voting models has
been established by Hinich, Ledyard, and Ordeshook [1972], Denzau and Kats [1977],
Coughlin and Nitzan [1981] and Wittman [1983]. The applications of the model were
popularized by Lindbeck and Weibull [1987] in their study of redistribution between
different socio-economic groups. This model has also been used in the study of the
political economy of special interest groups in Dixit and Londregan [1996], Dixit and
Londregan [1998]. The model in Dixit and Londregan [1996] provides the motivation
for the model developed in this chapter.
2.3 Data
I compiled a data set of the provision of public goods and services and demographic
characteristics for a sample of 116 US cities, which correspond to the largest cities in
the country. Table 2.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the aggregated variables of
the principal cities. Next, I describe in detail the sources of each of these datasets.
I use both aggregated and individual level data from the Census. I obtain individ-
ual demographic data from the 5 percent micro-samples Integrated Public Use Micro
Samples (IPUMS-USA) for the years 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 Ruggles, Fitch, Hall,
and Sobek [2000]. These data provide detailed individual and household information
like age, income, race, number of kids, commuting time, etc.
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An important limitation of these data is that, in order to preserve anonymity, the
place of residence is not reported for those individuals living in municipalities with
less than 100,000 inhabitants. Another limitation is that for some individuals infor-
mation on their urban status (city vs. suburb) is missing, again due to anonymity
reasons. I drop individuals with missing urban status from the sample 2. The aggre-
gated Census data comes from the full population Census tables for the years 1980,
1990, 2000, and 2010. I construct the demographic groups for the analysis of this
chapter from the IPUMS data set since the aggregated data does not contain enough
demographic detail.
From this data I construct the following demographic groups: households younger
than 65 without children (group 1), households younger tan 65 with children (group
2), and households older than 65 (group 3).
I collected data on revenues, spending and public employment for municipal gov-
ernments from the Census of Governments. The data for the central cities comes
from the Fiscally Standardized Cities data set, produced by Lincoln Institute of
Land Policy (LILP). These data solve a major problem in the study of local public
services across cities coming from the fact that different layers of government have
different responsibilities in their provision, and how these responsibilities are shared
2The IPUMS tables have been used in several studies comparing observations from the central
city and the suburbs. See for example Boustan and Shertzer [2010] , Glaeser and Kahn [2010].
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Figure 2.1: Expenditure shares on education, basic spending and redistribution for the period 1980-2010.
changes from region to region. The researchers at the LILP have consolidated rev-
enue and expenditure data from the Census of Governments for a selection of 116
large American cities for the period 1977 to 2010. The data from city governments
has been combined with a share from the overlying counties, school districts, and
special districts 3.
As an example of this problem, suppose we were to compare total public good
3See of Land Policy [2014] for a detailed description of the methodology.
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Figure 2.2: The dangers of comparing municipal expenditures. Example using general expenditures per capita.
Comparison between Baltimore, MD and Columbus, OH.
Source: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
provision in the cities of Baltimore, MD and Columbus, OH. This is illustrated in
Figure 2.2. If we were to look only at the expenditure of the city government, we
would conclude that Baltimore provides roughly three times more public goods than
Columbus. But once we take into account the provision by other government layers
that falls within the boundaries if each city we see that citizens from both cities enjoy
approximately the same level of public goods.
I merged the fiscal data for central cities and suburbs with the corresponding
tables from the decennial Census of Governments 4. Fiscal data are available for all
4Doing this is quite involved since the coding of Census Places changes from year to year and
24
years ending in five or seven, whereas demographic data are collected in all years
ending in zero. To merge the two I interpolate each variable from the Decennial
Census using a municipality specific linear trend to obtain estimates for all years in
the Census of Governments.
For the analysis in this chapter I aggregate the expenditure data into four cat-
egories: Education, Basic, Redistribution, and Other. The Education category is
composed of current spending on elementary and secondary education. The Basic
category includes expenditures on public safety (police and fire protection, correction
facilities, inspection and regulation), transportation, government administration, and
parks and recreation. Redistribution contains spending on social services and income
maintenance, which includes spending on hospitals and health, and housing assis-
tance. Finally, Other is the residual spending from all current expenditures, which
is composed of interest payments on debt, expenditure on utilities, liquor stores and
employee and retirement trust. The shares of expenditures in these categories vary
widely across cities, as can be seen in the distributions in Figure 2.1.
there does not seem to be any publicly available crosswalk to facilitate the task. Failure to find the
corresponding tables in the Census of Governments happens because (i) not all governments are
surveyed by the Census on every round, and (ii) changes in codes. There is no solution for the first
problem.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Population 484 525.901 952.585 93.024 8,214.426
Black Share 484 0.249 0.187 0.006 0.845
Other Share 484 0.078 0.074 0.003 0.323
Ethnic 484 0.408 0.135 0.064 0.691
Gini 484 0.470 0.043 0.335 0.572
Income Med 484 35.684 7.398 22.222 67.405
Renters Share 484 0.447 0.086 0.193 0.714
Education Exp Pc 484 1.103 0.352 0.453 2.972
Basic Exp 484 0.750 0.226 0.270 2.100
Redistribution Exp 484 0.395 0.370 0.002 2.849
Education Share 484 0.344 0.078 0.109 0.606
Basic Share 484 0.234 0.051 0.128 0.425
Redistribution Share 484 0.109 0.076 0.001 0.469
Total IG Revenue 484 0.611 0.648 0.028 3.249
Area 482 385.815 508.261 41.372 4,415.143
Number Suburbs 478 61.121 75.303 0 322
Note: 116 principal cities for the period 1980-2010. Population in thousands, all monetary variables in $1000s and
2000 dollars.
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2.4 Stylized Facts
In this section I look at the evidence on the relationship between the demographic
structure of cities and their level and composition of public good provision. First
I regress the budget shares of education, basic spending and redistribution on the
demographic shares of households with children and empty nesters (groups 2 and 3)
controlling for other demographic observables and city characteristics. I use state
and year fixed effects to account for unobservable state-specific characteristics that
affect the process through which cities come up with their budgets, and temporal
effects on the shares of different public goods that may reflect nation wide trends.
For each public good, the regression equation is given by
gkc,t = γs2s
2
c,t + γs3s
3
c,t +Xc,tβ + ηs + ηt + vc,t (2.4.1)
where gkc,t denotes the share of spending on public good category k in city c and
year t. The share of each group is given by sic,t, Xc,t contains other demographic
covariates and city characteristics, and ηs and ηt denote state and year fixed effects.
Estimating equation 2.4.1 using a fixed effects regression may not be sufficient on
its own to establish a causal relationship between the demographic composition of
a city and the shares of spending. It is possible that households within a MSA sort
between the city and the suburbs partly due to the different public goods that are
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offered (Goldstein and Pauly [1981]). For example, households with children might
choose to live in the suburbs if they consider the level of public education spending
in the city to be too low. One might be concerned, then, that the demographic com-
position of MSAs reflects the provision of public goods and services of its constituent
municipalities and not the other way around. It could be that some MSAs might
have some advantage in providing some kinds of public goods and that individuals
of different groups sort among MSAs according to those advantages.
To mitigate concerns about this form of reverse causality, I construct an instru-
mental variable that is correlated with changes in an citys demographic composition
but is not otherwise associated with changes in local public spending. In particular,
I predict the demographic composition of a city at time t based on the city’s initial
distribution and the national changes in the demographic composition. I then use
that predicted distribution as an instrument for the actual demographic distribution.
I start with the initial distribution observed in 1970 and project the changes in each
group’s size using the national growth rates observed in the IPUMS micro-data. The
initial share of each group in each city acts as a weight indicating how the national
growth of that group affected that particular city. For example, the share of empty
nesters grew faster than the share of households with children during the observed
period. The instrument will then predict greater changes in cities with a larger
28
proportion of empty nesters in 1970.
The main source of identifying variation from these instruments comes from the
different group shares in 1970 across MSAs. Therefore, the validity of these instru-
ments hinges on the 1970’s demographic composition and unobservables correlated
with it not having predictive power on the current shares of spending. Threats to the
validity of the instruments might come from mechanisms involving the demographic
shares if 1970 being correlated to some fundamentals that affect the shares of spend-
ing today, but it is hard to come with a plausible example. Boustan et al. [2013]
use a similar instrumental variables approach in their study of the effects of income
inequality on school district’s public finances where they simulate the current income
distribution in each area based on the observed distribution in 1970 and using the
national evolution of incomes.
Formally, for each city c and year t I compute the instrument for the share of the
demographic group i as
ŝitc =
µ̂tic∑
i µ̂tic
where µ̂tic = (1 + r
USA
ti )µ1970,ic represents the aggregate national population of group
i in year t, rUSAti is the growth rate of group i in the U.S. as a whole, and µ1970,ic is
the population level of group i in city c in 1970. The validity of these instruments
relies on the population levels in 1970 being unrelated to the expenditure shares in
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Figure 2.3: First stage correlations.
These scatter plots show the correlation between the predicted city demographic shares using the instruments and
the observed city shares.
the future.
The results from the regression in equation (2.4.1) are shown in Table 2.2. The
first three columns contain the regression results, including state and year fixed ef-
fects, for the expenditure shares in education, basic spending and redistribution. The
last three columns contain the results for the same specification using instrumental
variables.
Figure 2.3 shows the relationship between the synthetic and the actual city shares.
There is a strong and positive relationship between predicted shares and actual shares
for all three demographic groups, suggesting that much of the change in shares that
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occurred during the period 1970 to 2010 was driven by national trends rather than
by intra MSA sorting. The F -statistic between the actual and predicted shares for
group 2 is 25.38, and for group 3 is 37.27, well above the rule of thumb threshold
value of 10.
The degree of ethnic fractionalization, the main variable in Alesina et al. [1999],
is positively associated with budgets favoring education and basic spending, but neg-
atively so with spending on redistribution. The share of Hispanic residents has the
same pattern of effects, whereas the share of black residents has no significant effect
on any expenditure share. Finally, income inequality, as measured by the Gini coeffi-
cient, decreases the shares devoted to education and basic spending, but increases the
share of redistribution. Another interesting result is that the number of surrounding
suburban municipalities is negatively correlated with the share of pending in redis-
tribution but does not seem to have an effect on the other spending categories. Since
a higher number of suburbs increases possibilities for richer households to live out-
side the fiscal limits of the city, this is evidence that income redistribution becomes
increasingly harder to implement when households can easily sort themselves based
on income.
To look for nonlinearities in the relationship between demographic shares and
budget shares run a set of nonparametric regressions (shown in Appendix A.1).
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As suggested by the nonparametric results, there are clear limits on what can be
learned about the interactions between the demographic composition of cities and
their budget shares. In the next section I develop a model of public good provision in
cities that accounts for the democratic process through which budgets are decided.
In the model, groups are differentiated by their preferences over public goods and
by their income distribution. The proposed political process is a simplification of
the complicated process through which actual cities decide their budgets, involving
strategic interactions between city councils and mayor’s offices, but captures the
relevant fact that self-interested political agents are deciding the supply of public
goods with electoral goals in mind.
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Table 2.2: Regression Results
Educ. Basic Redist. Educ. Basic Redist.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share group 2 0.409∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗ 0.014 0.555∗∗ −0.681∗∗∗ 0.764∗∗
(0.079) (0.058) (0.100) (0.239) (0.197) (0.327)
Share group 3 −0.186∗∗ 0.044 0.049 −0.212∗∗ 0.200 −0.231
(0.085) (0.062) (0.107) (0.102) (0.98) (0.297)
Ethnic −0.160∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.025) (0.044) (0.037) (0.030) (0.050)
Share black 0.071∗∗ 0.016 −0.118∗∗∗ 0.051 0.094∗∗ −0.231∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.022) (0.037) (0.046) (0.038) (0.064)
Share other 0.316∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ 0.004 0.226 0.162 −0.495∗∗
(0.077) (0.056) (0.097) (0.173) (0.143) (0.237)
Gini −0.278∗∗ −0.209∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗ −0.249 −0.344∗∗∗ 0.650∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.087) (0.149) (0.157) (0.130) (0.216)
Log median income −0.072∗∗∗ 0.003 0.069∗∗ −0.093∗∗ 0.085∗∗ −0.048
(0.024) (0.018) (0.031) (0.043) (0.036) (0.060)
Log population −0.027∗ 0.018∗ 0.013 −0.038∗ 0.055∗∗∗ −0.037
(0.015) (0.011) (0.019) (0.022) (0.018) (0.031)
Nb. renters −0.248∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.210∗∗ −0.011 0.178
(0.058) (0.042) (0.072) (0.081) (0.067) (0.112)
Log college 0.018 −0.005 −0.028 0.029 −0.041∗∗ 0.021
(0.015) (0.011) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.030)
Tot. IG revenue 0.006 −0.018∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.018∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009)
Log nb. suburbs −0.010∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ 0.008∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Fixed effects? Y/R Y/R Y/R Y/R Y/R Y/R
IV? No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 478 478 478 478 478 478
R2 0.541 0.419 0.248
Adjusted R2 0.521 0.393 0.215
Residual Std. Error 0.054 0.039 0.067 0.054 0.045 0.074
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.
Note: In all of these regressions we are using year and state fixed effects. The first three columns contain the results
of the uninstrumented regressions. The last three columns contain the results using the simulated instruments for
demographic shares. The shares of group 1 have been omitted because of perfect multicollinearity with the other
group shares. Standard errors are clustered at the Census region level.
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2.5 Model
In this section I develop a political economy model of the provision of multiple public
goods in diverse communities. The provision of public goods in the city is the out-
come of the competition between two candidates for mayor’s office 5. A key concern
in models of multiple public goods provision is that the median voter is no longer
decisive. To address this issue, I assume that candidates have incomplete informa-
tion about voter’s preferences—as is common in models of probabilistic voting—and
that they decide their policy platforms in order to maximize their chances to win the
election 6.
5This is assumed only for simplicity and tractability. The politics of large cities are very complex,
and public goods are not always offered by the same layer of government in all places. The major
players in determining this provision are the mayor, city council and, sometimes, the county and
state government.
The form of government of most American cities falls into one of two categories: (i) a strong
mayor, in which the mayor is responsible for most policy decisions; or (ii) a weak mayor, in which
the city council is responsible for deciding policy and a city manager, or controller, is hired to
execute those policies. For large American cities, which are the main concern of this chapter, the
most common form of government is a strong-mayor, which makes the assumption made in the
model more plausible.
6This is done in order to guarantee that a political equilibrium exists. Nonetheless, assuming
that candidates are unable to perfectly predict the outcome of the election is quite realistic.
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The city is populated by I demographic groups with populations µ1, . . . , µI . The
income distribution of group i is given by Fi (with pdf fi). The city’s government
provides K public goods, indexed by k. There are two candidates in the city running
for mayor’s office, an incumbent I and a challenger C. They compete by making
credible promises about the level of public goods and the tax rate, (g, τ). Let the
policy proposal of a candidate x be denoted by (gx, τx). The voter’s preferences over
policy proposals are given by
vxi (y) = ui(g
x, τx; y) + εx for x = {I, C} (2.5.1)
where ui(g, τ ; y) is the part of utility that depends on the policy enacted, and ε
x
is a raw preference for candidate x that does not depend on policy. The deterministic
part of utility is given by
ui(g, τ ; y) = (1− τx) y +
∑
k
θki ln g
x
k (2.5.2)
where gk denotes per capita consumption of public good k, and ε
x is the raw
preference for candidate x. Normalizing εC = 0 we can interpret εI as the individual
bias for candidate I.
To save on notation, let the deterministic utility of a household with income y
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under the policies of candidate x be denoted by uxi (y) = ui(g
x, τx; y). The probability
that a voter with these preferences will vote for the incumbent mayor I is
Pr (vote for I | y) = Pr
(
εCi − εIi < uIi (y)− uCi (y) | y
)
(2.5.3)
= Φi
(
uIi (y)− uCi (y)
)
(2.5.4)
where Φi denotes the distribution of ε
C
i − εIi .
Assumption 1. The function Φ : R+ → [0, 1] has the following properties:
1. Φ(x) + Φ( 1
x
) = 1,
2. Φ is continuous and increasing in x, and
3. Φ is concave.
Aggregating the individual probability of voting for I for all income levels and
for all group sizes we get the expected number of votes for candidate I
V I =
∑
i
µi
∫
Φi
(
uIi (y)− uCi (y)
)
dFi(y) (2.5.5)
It is common in models of probabilistic voting to assume that candidates max-
imize the total number of votes. In that case, the policy proposal of candidate I
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given the policy proposal of candidate C is the solution to the following maximiza-
tion problem
max
g,τ
∑
i
µi
∫
Φi
(
uIi (y)− uCi (y)
)
dFi(y) (2.5.6)
subject to C(g)PC = τY + T (2.5.7)
where C(g) is the per capita dollar cost of providing g, PC is the total population
of the city, and T are state and federal transfers. For simplicity we assume that
C(g) =
∑
k ckgk, that is, the cost function is linear, and that there are no interactions
in the cost of providing different public goods. The parameters ck measure the dollar
cost of providing one unit of k per person.
Definition 2.5.1. A Nash equilibrium is a policy proposal for the both candidates
such that, given the opponent’s policy, each candidate can not increase her vote share
by deviating.
Proposition 2. A Nash equilibrium of the model exists.
Proof. Since Φi is concave, it follows that V
x is concave. If we show that 1− V x is
also concave, since the political game is zero-sum, we can apply Kakutani’s fixed-
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point theorem to conclude that a Nash Equilibrium exits. Without loss of generality,
normalize the population to 1. Then, note that
V x =
∑
i
µi
∫
1− Φi
(
v−xi (y)− vxi (y)
)
dF (y) (2.5.8)
= 1−
∑
i
µi
∫
Φi
(
v−xi (y)− vxi (y)
)
dF (y) (2.5.9)
So that
1− V x =
∑
i
µi
∫
Φi
(
v−xi (y)− vxi (y)
)
dF (y). (2.5.10)
Therefore, 1− V x is a concave function in the policy of −x. We conclude that a
Nash Equilibrium of this game exists.
If the objective function of the candidates is sufficiently concave, then there will
exist a unique equilibrium in pure strategies in which both candidates offer the same
policy proposal.
The first order conditions are given by
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∑
i
µi
∫
φi
{
vIi (y)− vCi (y)
} ∂vi
∂gk
dFi(y) = λckP
C (2.5.11)
∑
i
µi
∫
φi
{
vIi (y)− vCi (y)
} ∂vi
∂τ
dFi(y) = −λY (2.5.12)
Equation (2.5.11) equates the votes that the candidate would get from a marginal
increase in the provision of gk to the loss of votes due to the increase in taxes necessary
to finance it.
Under sufficient concavity of the objective function, there will exist a unique
equilibrium in pure strategies in which both candidates converge to the same policy,
so that in equilibrium vIi (y) = v
C
i (y). Using the utility function given in equation
2.5.2, we can then rewrite the two first order conditions as
∑
i
µiφi(0)θ
k
i
1
gk
= λckP
C (2.5.13)
∑
i
µiφi(0)
∫
ydFi(y) = λY (2.5.14)
Combining both first order conditions we get that the equilibrium levels of pro-
vision of public goods are given by
gk =
Ȳ
ck
(∑
i s̃iφiθ
i
k∑
i s̃iφiŷi
)
for k = 1, . . . , K (2.5.15)
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where φi := Φ
′
i(0), s̃i =
µi
PC
is the fraction of the city’s population belonging to
group i and ŷi :=
∫
yfi(y)dy is the average income of group i in the city.
The solution for the provision of each public good, equation 2.5.15, is as if the
government collects all the output generated by the households in the city and di-
vides it across public goods according to a weighted average of the preferences of all
demographic groups. The numerator of the term in parenthesis in equation 2.5.15
measures how households in the city value that particular good, θiK , weighted by that
group’s share of the elecotrate and by the parameter φi, that measures the denisty
of swing voters and therefore the number of votes that are susceptible to be gained
by marginally satisfying that group.
We now can write total spending on good k as
TSk = ckgkP
C =
∑
i φis̃iθ
k
i∑
i φis̃is
y
i
for k = 1, . . . , K (2.5.16)
where syi is the share of total income belonging to group i. That is,
syi =
∫
yfi(y)dy∑
i µi
∫
fi(y)dy
=
ŷi∑
i µuŷi
(2.5.17)
Total spending in the city is the amount of resources spent providing all public
goods and services
TS =
∑
k
TSk = P
C
∑
k
ckgk =
∑
k
∑
i φis̃iθ
k
i∑
i φis̃is
y
i
(2.5.18)
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Combining equations (2.5.16) and (2.5.18) we get an expression for the share of
spending on public good k
sgk =
ckgkP
C
TS
=
∑
i φis̃iθ
k
i∑
k
∑
i φis̃iθ
k
i
(2.5.19)
The intuition for equation 2.5.19 is similar to that for the optimal provision of
each public good (equation 2.5.15). Those groups that represent a large share of the
electorate (a high s̃i)) or have a high proportion of swing voters (a high φi) will have
a higher influence in determining the distribution of public goods.
Proposition 3. A marginal increase in the urban share of group i will increase the
share of spending on good k if
θki∑
k θ
k
i
>
∑
i φisiθ
k
i∑
k
∑
i φisiθ
k
i
(2.5.20)
and decrease it otherwise.
Proof. Taking the partial derivative of (2.5.19) with respect to s̃i we have
∂sgk
∂s̃i
=
θki
(∑
i φisi
∑
k θ
k
i
)
−
(∑
i φisiθ
k
i
)∑
k θ
k
i(∑
i φisi
∑
k θ
k
i
)2 (2.5.21)
setting this expression to be greater than zero and rearranging terms we get the
desired result.
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That is, in this model, an increase in the share of the electorate belonging to
group i will lead to an increase in the share of public expenditures devoted to good
k if the the willingness to pay for good k relative to the willingness to pay for one
additional unit of all public goods for members of group i is greater than that for
the average (weighted by φi) of the rest of the electorate.
2.6 Estimation
The system of equations described in equation 2.5.15 describes the equilibrium dis-
tribution for each city and year. To estimate the model I assume that marginal
costs are imperfectly observed as is common in the industrial organization literature
(Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes [1995]). Then, I estimate the parameters of the model
using a multi-equation nonlinear GMM approach. Below I describe the details of the
estimation.
Taking logarithms on both sides of equation 2.5.15 we get
ln(gk) = ln
(∑
i
φiθ
i
kµi
)
− ln
(
Ȳ
∑
i
φiµiȳi
)
− ln (ck) for k in 1, . . . , K. (2.6.1)
I assume that marginal costs are imperfectly observed by the econometrician and
can be modeled as
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ln(ck) = x
′
kγ + νk for k in 1, . . . , K (2.6.2)
where xk is a vector of variables affecting the marginal costs. Furthermore, I allow
for some preference heterogeneity by allowing the θki parameters to depend on some
city characteristics θkic = θ̄
k
i + θ
k
i z
c, where zc is a vector of city characteristics, like
census region. Combining equations 2.6.1 and 2.6.2 give the estimating equations.
The taste parameters are identified by exogenous variation in the demographic
shares created by the instruments discussed in section 2.4, which in turn rely on the
demographic shares in 1970 being uncorrelated with the unobservable marginal cost
components in the sample periods. The φ parameters are only identified up to scale,
so for the purpose of estimation I make the normalization φ1 = 1.
Following Hansen [1982], I estimate the model by nonlinear GMM using moments
from the provision of the three public goods for each city and year. Moments are
given by the condition E(vctzct) = 0, where vct = (v1ct, . . . , vKct) are the error terms
given by equation 2.6.1, and zct is the vector of instruments for city c and year t.
The GMM estimator is given by
arg min
β
[
T∑
t=1
N∑
c=1
1
NT
zctmct(·|β)
]′
W
[
T∑
t=1
N∑
c=1
1
NT
zctmct(·|β)
]
(2.6.3)
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where β denotes the vector of model parameters, W is a weighting matrix and
mct(·|β) = [m1ct(·|β), . . . ,mKct (·|β)]′ is a vector of moments for each public good k in
city c and year t and
mkct = − ln
(∑
i
φiθ
i
kµi
)
+ ln
(
Ȳ
∑
i
φiµiȳi
)
+ x′kγ (2.6.4)
2.7 Empirical Results
The parameter estimates of the preference parameters are shown in table 2.3. The
relative magnitudes of the preference parameters are consistent with the reduced
form results shown in table 2.2. Young households with children (group 1) have
a strong preference for basic public goods, contrast to households with children,
who have a preference for education spending. The elderly have a preference for
redistributive spending followed by basic spending; they do not care much about
education spending.
The model does a reasonable good job at fitting the levels of spending on the
three public goods in most cities, but it cannot explain the very low and high levels
of provision observed in some of the cities, especially for education spending.
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Table 2.3: Estimation Results
estimates SE
θ11 1.861 0.512
θ12 5.909 0.798
θ13 -4.115 1.461
θ21 2.658 0.204
θ22 1.312 0.189
θ23 0.753 0.190
θ31 0.794 1.313
θ32 4.949 1.864
θ33 5.637 2.587
φ2 8.352 1.173
φ3 0.603 0.289
Note: The first column shows the estimated preference parameters. θik denotes the preference parameter of group i
over public good k. The second column shows the standard errors.
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Figure 2.4: Predicted versus observed levels of log per-capita spending for all cities in the sample ranked from lowest
to highest.
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2.8 Policy Analysis
In this section I look at how the projected demographic changes in each city are
likely to translate in changes in the level and composition of the public goods and
services they provide. To do that, I estimate the growth rate of each group for each
city during the period from 2000 to 2010 and use it to predict population levels in
the year 2030. Using the estimated model I predict the levels of provision of each
public good in that year. On average, cities are loosing households with children and
gaining young households without children and empty nesters, although there is a lot
of variability from city to city. On average, spending in education is going to increase
slightly bu 2%, with an interquantila range ov variation of 16%. In contrast, basic
public goods and redistribution expenditures are projected to increase on average in
most cities by approximately 20% each.
Figure 2.6 shows the projected changes education spending per capita for all the
cities in the sample. Cities for which education spending is projected to increase are
characterized by a growing population of young households without children, who
still value education considerably. The total effect on the distribution of public goods
cannot be attributed to the population change in a single group, but instead depends
on the aggregate changes of all groups. For example, consider the case of Hartford and
Philadelphia. Both are expected to loose a similar share of households with children,
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yet Hartford will see a 38% increase in their elderly population while Philadelphia’s
share will only increase by 4%. Instead, Philadelphia gains 16% of young families
without children to Hartford’s 2%. The result is that Hartford’s provision of public
education is expected increase by a meager 5% whereas Philadelphia’s increases by
14%.
Table 2.4 offers a comparison of five large cites: Chicago, Los Angeles, New York
and San Francisco. The table shows the projected demographic changes in each of
these cities along with the changes in the level and composition of public goods.
In all of these cities—with the exception of San Francisco—there is a clear trend
of loosing young families and gaining elderly residents. Consequently, the model
predicts significant lower expenditures in education in these cities. Chicago stands
out for its relatively large projected increase in childless families, which might explain
the 23% expected increase in basic expenditures.
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Table 2.4: Projected Public Good Provision
City Chicago, IL Los Angeles, CA New York, NY San Francisco, CA
Growth rate group 1 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.04
Growth rate group 2 -0.27 -0.07 -0.09 0.02
Growth rate group 3 0.04 0.23 0.15 0.10
Change in education (1000s) -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.01
Change in basic (1000s) 0.31 0.13 0.17 0.03
Change in redistribution (1000s) 0.01 0.39 0.14 0.12
Growth rate in education -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01
Growth rate in basic 0.30 0.15 0.21 0.02
Growth rate in redistribution 0.06 0.50 0.19 0.12
Table 2.5: Projected demographic changes and demand for public services.
49
Change in Education Expenditures 2010-30
0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Gary, IN
Phoenix, AZ
Cleveland, OH
Detroit, MI
Modesto, CA
Long Beach, CA
Riverside, CA
Sioux Falls, SD
Oakland, CA
Boise, ID
Anchorage, AK
Reno, NV
Stockton, CA
Fresno, CA
Denver, CO
Akron, OH
Chicago, IL
Flint, MI
Los Angeles, CA
Minneapolis, MN
Spokane, WA
Dayton, OH
Bakersfield, CA
Huntington Beach, CA
Grand Rapids, MI
Toledo, OH
Tacoma, WA
Milwaukee, WI
Fort Wayne, IN
Saint Paul, MN
Warren, MI
Saint Louis, MO
Cincinnati, OH
Kansas City, MO
Sacramento, CA
Wichita, KS
Springfield, MA
Des Moines, IA
San Francisco, CA
Raleigh, NC
Madison, WI
Seattle, WA
Little Rock, AR
Norfolk, VA
Montgomery, AL
Chattanooga, TN
Columbia, SC
Oklahoma City, OK
Hartford, CT
Manchester, NH
Portland, OR
Lexington-Fayette, KY
Tulsa, OK
Austin, TX
Richmond, VA
New York, NY
Memphis, TN
San Antonio, TX
Baton Rouge, LA
Bridgeport, CT
Charlotte, NC
Baltimore, MD
Houston, TX
Boston, MA
Jackson, MS
Syracuse, NY
Garland, TX
Philadelphia, PA
Greensboro, NC
Nashville-Davidson, TN
Corpus Christi, TX
Chesapeake, VA
Yonkers, NY
Mobile, AL
Virginia Beach, VA
Rochester, NY
Buffalo, NY
Knoxville, TN
Pittsburgh, PA
New Haven, CT
C
ity
Figure 2.5: Projected changes in education expenditures for the period 2010-30.
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Change in Basic Expenditures 2010-30
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Figure 2.6: Projected changes in basic expenditures for the period 2010-30.
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Change in Redistribution Expenditures 2010-30
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Figure 2.7: Projected changes in redistributive expenditures for the period 2010-30.
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Chapter 3
Demographic Composition and Public Goods Pro-
vision in Cities
3.1 Motivation
More than half of the world population lives in cities, and more than eight out of
ten Americans live in metropolitan areas, which are all centered around a city. We
rely on local governments to provide a wide variety of goods and services that have a
direct impact on our well being, and in the United States roughly one eighth of the
national GDP is spent by local governments. A large body of research has explored
the political economy of local public good provision, but not much attention has been
paid to the particular problems that arise in large cities—city governments provide
a large mix of public goods and have diverse constituencies that differ in more than
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their income 7.
Almost everybody will have to settle for a public good level and composition
different from their preferred one. But unlike a country, where it is fair to assume that
citizens are unlikely to move in response to changes in fiscal policy, urban residents
are highly mobile. Resident’s of a city can easily move away from it jurisdiction if
they are unhappy with the bundle of public goods and services provided. This poses
significant constraints into the provision problem. This means that the demographic
composition of a city government’s constituency will reflect the kind of public goods
it offers since people will choose to live in the city that offers the bundle of public
goods they like the most.
This two-way feedback calls for a joint analysis of public goods determination and
the demographic composition of cities. This is the purpose of this chapter. I propose
a new model of how the level and composition of public services are determined in a
city. The model allows for an arbitrary number of groups with different preferences
over public goods and within group income heterogeneity. I embed the political
economy model of public good provision in the city into a location choice model
between the central city and the suburbs in order to study the interactions between
mobility and the political conflict over the composition of the budget.
7Glaeser [2012]
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I develop a model of the provision of multiple public goods that allows households
to belong to different groups that differ in their preferences over the size and com-
position of the services provided by the city. The model is, at this point, agnostic
about what interpretation should be given to these groups. The most natural inter-
pretation is that each group corresponds to different demographics—like age group,
ethnicity, religion, family structure, etc. Preferences over the size of the budget and
how it should be split will depend on the income of the voter and her group. At the
end of the day, public policy is decided through a democratic precess that aggregates
all these preferences. But of course, nobody is forced to live int the city. If house-
holds are not happy with the current services provided, or with the price of housing,
and can get a higher utility elsewhere they will move out. By doing so they will
change the demographic composition and the income distribution of the electorate
and, hence, the bundle of services that is decided. I assume that the local government
finances its expenditures only with a property tax. Even though local governments
use a number of revenue instruments, local taxes are the most commonly used.
I solve the model numerically and conduct a series of comparative statics exper-
iments. First, I look at the effect of changing the demographic composition of the
city when there is no outside option—no mobility is allowed. I then allow households
to belong to different groups that are differentiated in their preferences for different
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public goods, and endogenize the demographic composition of the city by allowing
them to choose between living in the city or in the suburbs. I consider the case of
two demographic groups and two public goods living in a metropolitan area with one
central city. There is a majority and a minority group with the majority represent-
ing 80% of the population in the metropolitan area. To understand how preference
heterogeneity affects the demographic composition of the city and the distribution of
public goods offered I gradually increase the degree of dispersion in preferences start-
ing from the case of complete agreement—all groups value the two goods the same
way—to the case in which they have completely opposed preferences. This leads to a
surprising result: preference dispersion has a U-shape effect on total public expendi-
tures in the city. At first, when the two demographic groups start to diverge in their
preferences, the equilibrium mix of public goods moves away from the ideal mix of
each group. This leads to a lower support for public spending as households want to
substitute public goods for private consumption. At the same time, the demographic
composition of the city begins to change as well as some of the richer households in
the majority move to the suburbs. Eventually, as preferences continue to diverge,
the city becomes more homogeneous with rich households from the majority moving
into the city and households in the minority leaving to the suburbs. This increased
homogeneity changes the political balance in the city and the mix of public goods
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offered. Eventually, this mix gets closer and closer to the ideal of the majority group
and households vote to substitute private consumption for public goods, thus leading
to an increase in the size of total expenditures.
The structure of the chapter is a s follows. Section 3.3 develops the model and
derives some comparative statics. In section 3.4 I explore some of the properties of
the model through some numerical exercises.
This chapter is related to several strands of literature. It borrows most of its
economic environment from models of inter jurisdictional sorting, as the ones that
followed from Epple and Romer [1991]. The main idea behind these papers is that
households are mobile and choose in which community to live based on the available
combination of housing prices, taxes, amenities, and public goods. Housing prices
result from local housing markets that must clear in all communities. The level of
public good in each community is chosen by majority rule and reflects the tastes and
endowments of the residents of the community. In most of these models, households
differ only in their income endowments, which are exogenous. Equilibrium in these
models is characterized by income stratification across communities. When house-
holds only differ in their income levels, this stratification is stark; meaning that there
is no overlap in the incomes of any pair of communities.
Inter-jurisdictional sorting models, or Tiebout models, as they are also known,
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have been used in a wide array of applications. Epple and Romer [1991] use their
model to study how local governments might engage in redistributive policies when
households are mobile. They use a calibrated version of their model to argue that
significant levels of redistribution can be achieved even at the local level. ? use a
Tiebout model to understand what are the incentives at play behind zoning ordi-
nances and what are their welfare effects. Kerry Smith, Sieg, Spencer Banzhaf, and
Walsh [2004] estimate a Tiebout model to measure the welfare effects of environmen-
tal improvements.
This chapter has in common with this literature the fact that each commu-
nity’s public good offer depends on the demographic characteristics of the electorate
through a social choice mechanism. Generally these papers can only deal with very
restrictive forms of heterogeneity across households and assume some preference re-
strictions that lead to a median voter result. My model differs with the inter juris-
dictional sorting models in that I only have one community—the central city—and
an outside option—the suburbs—that serves the purpose of endogeneizing the city’s
population.
The spatial structure used in this chapter is similar to the one used in the urban
models of the quality of life started by Rosen [1979] and Roback [1982]. The purpose
of these models is to explain the observed differences in wages, rents and amenities
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across cities. To do so, they comprise equilibrium conditions for households and
firms: identical households must derive the same level of utility no matter where
they live, and firms must get the same profits in all locations. Were this not to
be the case, households and firms would relocate, moving to the places that offer
them higher payoffs. In doing so, they would drive housing prices up and push down
wages until utilities are equalized. These models make predictions on city’s wages
and housing prices as functions of city’s characteristics, such as amenities and land
endowments.
More recently, Diamond [2013] uses a similar framework to estimate a structural
model of cities. She extends the standard model of a system of cities to allow work-
ers to have heterogeneous preferences for locations. She uses her estimated model to
asses the extent to which differences in amenities were responsible for differentially
driving skilled and non-skilled workers to different cities. For the estimation of her
model she uses a discrete choice approach similar to the one proposed by Berry et al.
[1995]. Preference parameters are identified by local demand shocks that depend
on the industry mix of each city (the mix between skilled and non-skilled labor)
and their interaction with housing supply elasticities. The idea behind her identi-
fication strategy is that cities’ wages and rents will respond differently to demand
shocks depending on their housing elasticity. Workers migration decisions will then
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respond to these changes in wages, rents and endogenous amenities pinning down
their preference parameters.
The model in this chapter is also related the literature on ethnic conflict. For
example, the paper by Alesina et al. [1999] can be seen as an application of my model.
They propose a simple model that relates ethnic fractionalization to the provision of
public goods. The main prediction of the model is that higher fractionalization leads
to lower provision of publics goods. They test this prediction looking at county, city,
and metropolitan area data in the US and find that this is actually the case.
This chapter uses the idea of structure induced equilibrium developed by Shepsle
[1979b] to obtain a political equilibrium with a multi-dimensional policy space and
extends it to allow for multiple groups with distinct preferences. The basic idea is
that voting takes place in each dimension separately and simultaneously, taking as
given the provision of all the other public goods. The outcome in each dimension is
determined by a majority rule. This gives a reaction function for each policy. The
equilibrium concept employed is that each of these reaction functions must be an
optimal response. In other words, the political equilibrium is the fixed point of the
optimal response mapping. When households belong to different groups with differ-
ent preferences there will not be a decisive voter. Instead, the political equilibrium
in each dimension will be characterized by two opposing coalitions of voters from the
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different demographic groups present (though not all groups need to be part of each
coalition) such that the coalition favoring higher provision has the same size as the
coalition favoring less provision.
In the first model I propose, with only income heterogeneity, enough restrictions
are placed on the preferences of voters to obtain a median voter result without the
need to use a structure induced equilibrium. The theoretical underpinning of this
approach was developed by Grandmont [1978]. The key idea in this model is that
all the heterogeneity in preferences can be collapsed into a single dimension, like
income. To my knowledge, this is the first application of Grandmont [1978] in the
context of local public good provision.
3.2 Model with a Single Type
There is a continuum of households differentiated by their level of income y. Income
is distributed according to the distribution function F (y) with density f (y). There
exists a single, featureless city, in the economy. Households that live in the city get
utility from the consumption of housing services h, and a private composite good
b. In addition, households also value consumption of public goods that are offered
by the metropolitan government and financed by taxes levied on its residents. I
will focus on property taxes since this is the preferred instrument to finance local
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government services in the US. Tax rates and the level of provision of public goods
are decided simultaneously by majority voting among the urban population.
Households that choose not to live in the city get a reservation utility level. I
provide more details about the notion of spatial equilibrium I use below. I start by
characterizing the equilibrium in the closed city, when people can not move out of
the city.
3.2.1 Preferences
I assume utility from public goods consumption are multiplicatively separable from
utility from housing services and the private good, and are given by the utility
function
U (g, h, b) = J (g) {v (h, b) + C}
where J(g) is increasing and concave, v (h, b) is homogeneous of degree δ in h
and b, and concave in both arguments, and C is a constant. This constant can
be rationalized by having a function v (h, b) of the Stone-Gary form that requires
households to consume some subsistence levels of housing and private good. As
argued in Calabrese, Cassidy, Epple, Alesina, and Cullen [2002], the homogeneity
assumption is widely used in the optimal taxation literature, in dynamic simulation
models, and in a variety of other applications in economics.
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Households decisions must satisfy the following budget constraint
y = (1 + t) phh+ b
where ph is the suppliers price of housing. Lets denote the gross price of housing
by p := (1 + t) ph, where t is the tax rate on housing services.
I assume the following timing of events:
1. Household decide whether to live in the city and, if so, they decide how much
housing services to consume. The housing market clears.
2. Urban households vote on the level of public goods and the tax rate.
3. Consumption of the private composite good takes place.
This timing assumption implies that at the time of voting the urban population is
fixed.
These timing assumptions are common in the literature studying public good
provision with mobility, as in Fernandez and Rogerson [1996].
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3.2.2 Housing Demand and Supply
When deciding how much housing and private good to consume, households solve
the following maximization problem
maxh,b U (g, h, b) = J (g) {v (h, b) + C}
s.t. y = (1 + t) phh+ b
Next, I use some well known properties of systems of demand with homothetic
preferences to get to an expression of the indirect utility function. Taking first order
conditions we have that
J (g) vh (h, b) = λp
J (g) vb (h, b) = λ
From which we can obtain an expression for the marginal rate of substitution
between housing and private good consumption
MRShb (h, b) :=
vh (h, b)
vb (h, b)
= p
where we define p := (1 + t) ph as the gross of tax housing price. Using the fact
that vh (h, b) and vb (h, b) are both homogeneous we find that MRShb depends only
on the ratio of housing to private good consumed
MRShb (h/b) =
(
1
b
)δ−1
vh (h, b)(
1
b
)δ−1
vb (h, b)
=
vh (h/b, 1)
vb (h/b, 1)
= p
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Since nothing in the above equation depends on y, we have that all households
will consume housing and private good in the same proportion regardless of their
income. In other words, h/b = φ (p) for all households, where φ (p) is a positive
decreasing function of the tax rate. Plugging in the budget constraint we can write
h
y − ph
= φ (t)⇔ h (p, y) =
(
φ (p)
1 + φ (p) p
)
y = ξ (p) y
where ξ (p) :=
(
φ(p)
1+φ(p)p
)
. Thus, demand is linear in income y.
The aggregate housing demand in the community is
Hd (p) :=
∫
N
h (p, y) f (y) dy = ξ (p)
∫
N
yf (y) dy = ξ (p)ENy
where ENy is the average income in the city.
The indirect utility function is defined as
V (g, p, y) := U (g, h∗ (p, y) , y − ph∗ (p, y)) ,
so in our case we get
V (g, p, y) = J (g) {v (h∗ (p, y) , y − ph∗ (p, y)) + C}
= J (g) {v (ξ (p) y, y − pξ (p) y) + C}
= J (g)
{
v (ξ (p) , 1− pξ (p)) yδ + C
}
= J (g)C + yδ {J (g) v (ξ (p) , 1− pξ (p))}
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Housing is supplied in each community by competitive developers according to
the following supply function
Hs
(
ph
)
= Lhs
(
ph
)
where hs
(
ph
)
is the housing supplied per unit of land in the community. The
price of housing, ph, is found at the intersection of housing supply and the aggregate
housing demand
Lhs
(
ph
)
=
∫
N
h (p, y) f (y) dy
3.2.3 City Government
The city government’s budget constraint is given by
c (g,N) = tph
∫
N
h (p, y) f (y) dy = tphH (p)
where c (g,M) is the monetary cost of providing the bundle of public goods g in
a city with a population of M . In the comparative static exercises I do, I consider
a linear cost function in the amount of public goods provided that doesn’t depend
on the size of the population. This is easy to relax. Given that this model includes
several public goods there are many interesting questions one could ask about the
technology to provide these goods.
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3.2.4 Political Equilibrium
Urban residents must vote on the size of the public budget, as given by the tax rate
that they decide, and on the composition of government expenditures, as given by the
vector of local public goods g = (g1, g2, . . . , gK). This is a multi-dimensional voting
problem which, in general, does not have an equilibrium. In this case, though,
the assumptions made on households preferences are enough to guarantee that a
majority voting equilibrium exists and is given by the desired public bundle of the
median income household.
In particular, the indirect utility function that I derived above falls into the class
of intermediate form preferences described by Grandmont [1978]. This is also known
in the public choice literature as an “order restriction” assumption.
Voters understand the relationship between policy bundles and the gross-of-tax
cost of housing as given by the city’s budget constraint. It is convenient to rewrite this
constraint by using in the definition of the gross-of-tax price of housing to substitute
out the tax rate. Doing so we get
p = ph +
c (g,N)
Hs (ph)
.
Each voter’s preferred policy bundle is then given by the following maximization
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problem
max
g
V (g, p, y) = J (g)C + yδ {J (g) v (ξ (p) , 1− pξ (p))}
s.t. p = ph +
c (g,N)
Hs (ph)
For simplicity, I assume obtain their housing services from absentee landlord,
who are not present in the city (exogenous to the model) and who do not vote. This
assumption is very common in the literature
If we plug the community’s budget constrain we get an expression of the indirect
utility function that looks like this
W (g, y) := J (g) + yδH (g)
This preferences are a special case of what is known as “intermediate preferences”
which are preferences that can be written as
W (q, α) = J (q) +K (α)H (q; )
where q can be a multidimensional object, and α ∈ R is the only source of
heterogeneity among voters. Furthermore, K (α) needs to be a monotonic function
of any degree, and J and H common to all voters. (Persson and Tabellini [2002])
The next proposition shows that the preferred policy of the median voter is the
majority voting equilibrium when preferences are of the intermediate form.
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Proposition 4. A Condorcet winner exists and it coincides with the bliss point of
the voter with median income ym.
Proof. The proof is based on a separation argument similar to the one used to show
the median theorem with single-crossing preferences (Gans and Smart [1996]).
For any bundle of public goods g 6= gm it must be the case that
W (gm, ym) = J (gm) + ymH (gm) ≥ J (g) + ymH (g) = W (g, ym) .
Rearranging terms we have
ym S
J (g)− J (gm)
H (gm)−H (g)
if H (g)−H (gm) S 0.
If H (g)−H (gm) > 0, then for all y > ym
y > ym ≥ J (g)− J (g
m)
H (gm)−H (g)
so that
W (gm, y) = J (gm) + yH (gm) > J (g) + yH (g) .
A similar argument can be made for the case in which H (g)−H (gm) < 0. This
means that the preferred policy of the median voter always gets the support of at
least half the electorate.
Next I provide an alternative proof of this result with a nicer geometric interpre-
tation.
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Proof. Take any pair of public goods bundles g and g′, and define the set of voters
that prefer g over g′ as
H := {y : W (g′, y) ≤ W (g, y)}
= {y : J (g′) + yH (g′) ≤ J (g) + yH (g)}
= {y : y (H (g′)−H (g)) ≤ J (g)− J (g′)}
and the set of those who prefer g′ over g as
H ′ := {y : y (H (g′)−H (g)) ≥ J (g)− J (g′)}
If H and H ′ are convex, then it must be the case that the median voter is decisive.
Take y0, y1 ∈ H. Then,
J (g′) + (θy0 + (1− θ) y1)H (g′) ≤ J (g) + (θy0 + (1− θ) y1)H (g)
⇔ (θy0 + (1− θ) y1) (H (g′)−H (g)) ≤ J (g)− J (g′)
which is true since y0 and y1 are in H. Hence H is a convex set. A similar
argument can be used to show that H ′ is also convex.
The assumption of intermediate preferences is related to the assumption of single-
crossing preferences, i.e. the requirement that
∂2V
∂y∂gi
> 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n
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although it is less general. As single-crossing, it works because it reduces the hetero-
geneity in preferences created by having a multidimensional policy space to a single
dimension of individual heterogeneity (income, in our case). Then, a standard sepa-
ration argument can be used. This separation is emphasized in the second proof, in
which the Condorcet winner is essentially a bundle of publics goods that divides the
electorate in equal parts. No voter is particularly happy with it, but no majority of
voters can be found that would support an alternative policy.
Next I discuss how the equilibrium is characterized in the closed city, when the
population in the city is fixed, and then I incorporate the conditions that guarantee
a spatial equilibrium when households choose whether to live in the city or not.
3.2.5 Equilibrium in the Closed City
An equilibrium in the closed city, i.e. when individuals cannot choose to live outside
the city, is a tuple (g∗, p∗h, t
∗) such that
1. The housing market clears:
Hs (p∗h) = µ
∫ ȳ
y
h (p∗, y) f (y) dy,
2. Given p∗h , there is a majority voting equilibrium, i.e. (g
∗, t∗) is the preferred
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policy of the median voter,
g∗, p∗ = arg max
g,p
V
(
g, p, ymed
)
s.t. p = p∗h +
c (g,M)
Hs (p∗h)
3. The city runs a balanced budget:
c (g∗,M) = t∗p∗hH
s (p∗h)
3.2.6 Equilibrium in the Open City
When households can choose whether to live in the city or not, the size of the
urban population and the urban income distribution will depend on the bundles
of consumption that are available in the city, including the public goods that are
provided by the city’s government.
Before I explain the notion of spatial equilibrium used in the model, it is nec-
essary to introduce some new notation. Let fmsa (y) be the income distribution in
the metropolitan area—the central city and its suburbs—and f (y) be the income
distribution in the city. Furthermore, let Pr (city | y) be the probability that an in-
dividual with income y will choose to live in the city. The relationship between the
urban and the economy-wide income distributions is given by
f (y) =
Pr (city | y) fmsa (y)∫ ȳ
y
Pr (city | y) fmsa (y) dy
.
72
Pr (city | y) will depend on the equilibrium objects that characterize the equi-
librium in the closed city, and on the particular notion of spatial equilibrium being
used. I will assume that households that choose not to live in the city receive a
reservation utility ū (y) that may depend on their income. The value of living in the
city for an individual with income y is given by the indirect utility
V ∗ (y) := V (g∗, p∗h, y) .
Furthermore, in order to describe the urban population as a probability I assume
that households get a random, choice specific value that is identically distributed
and does not depend on income.
The probability of living in the city for an individual with income y is then given
by
Pr (city | y) = Pr (ū (y) + εo ≤ V ∗ (y) + εc | y)
= Pr (εo − εc ≤ V ∗ (y)− ū (y) | y) .
Under the additional assumption that the shocks are distributed as Type-I ex-
treme value, as is usual in discrete choice models, we have a closed form expression
for the above probability:
s (y) := Pr (city | y) = exp {V
∗ (y)}
exp {V ∗ (y)}+ exp {ū (y)}
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where s (y) is the notation I will use to refer to the urban share of individuals
with income y.
Putting it all together, we can define an equilibrium in the open city is a tuple
of prices, taxes and public goods (p∗h, g
∗) such that
1. The housing market clears:
Hs (p∗h) = µ
∫
h (p∗, y) f (y) dy
2. There is a political equilibrium in the city:
g∗, p∗ = arg max
g,p
V
(
g, p, ymed
)
s.t. p = ph +
c (g,N)
Hs (ph)
3. The city government runs a balanced budget:
c (g∗,M) = t∗p∗hH
s (p∗h)
4. The urban shares for each group and income are given by
s (y) =
exp {V (g∗, p∗, y)}
exp {V (g∗, p∗, y)}+ exp {ū (y)}
which implies that the urban income distributions are given by
f (y) =
s (y) fmsa (y)∫
s (y) fmsa (y) dy
=
s (y) fmsa (y)
s
,
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the median voter in the city is is given by∫ ymed
y
f (y) dy =
1
2
,
and the size of the city is
M = N
∫ ȳ
y
s (y) fmsa (y) dy.
3.3 Model with Several Types
Keeping the same environment as above, I now allow households to belong to different
groups who differ amongst themselves in their preferences for public goods. Let there
be I groups indexed by i. Each group has mass µi, and is allowed to have a different
income distribution Fi(y) with density fi (y), and support
[
yi, ȳi
]
.
Preferences are still given by a utility function of the form
U (g, h, b) = Ji (g) {v (h, b) + C}
where the difference with respect to the previous section is that Ji (g) can be differ-
ent in each group. Note that the notion of political equilibrium that I use in this
section does not rely on the median voter being decisive, as I will explain later. This
means that there is no reason to restrain ourselves to a utility function that leads to
intermediate form indirect utility. This opens the possibility to study the political
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conflict over other issues apart from public goods, like for instance with what tax
instruments should the city finance its budget, or the amount of redistribution at
the local (or national) level. These extensions are left for future research.
I show in the next section that a majority equilibrium still exists when voters
from all groups vote on each dimension separately.
Housing market clearing is now given by
Lh
(
ph
)
=
G∑
i=1
µi
∫
hi (p, y) dFi (y)
where hi (p, y) is the housing demand of and individual of group i with income y.
3.3.1 Political equilibrium
I now turn to discuss how one can characterize the voting equilibrium in this envi-
ronment. With more than one group we cannot appeal to the median voter result
we derived in the previous section. Instead I will use a result by De Donder [2013]
to show that we can still find a Condorcet winner when all the groups vote simul-
taneously on a single issue, provided that the preferences of each group satisfy the
single-crossing condition. I then impose that election outcomes in all dimensions
be consistent with each other, in a way similar to the requirement of mutual best
response of a Nash Equilibrium. This is known in the voting literature as a structure
induced equilibrium, a concept that was first introduced by Shepsle [1979a].
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Assumption 5. For each group i, the indirect utility function satisfies the single-
crossing condition
∂2Vi (g, ph, y)
∂y∂gk
> 0 for all k = 1, . . . , K.
Assumption 5 requires that the marginal rate of substitution between different
public goods be increasing in income. This condition is equivalent to an ordering
restriction on the preferences represented by the utility function. In particular it
demands that the preference relation between any pair of alternatives g and g′ not
be weakened by increasing y.
Consider the voting problem on a given dimension when quantities for all other
public goods are held constant. Lets denote by Bki (y, g−k) the preferred level of
public good gk for a voter with income y when the level of all other public goods is
g−k. In other words,
Bki (y, g−k) : = arg max
gk
Vi (gk, g−k, p, y)
s.t. p = ph +
c (g,N)
Hs (ph)
It can be shown that Bki (y, g−k)is a continuous and increasing function (the
fact that it is increasing follows from Theorem 1 in Milgrom and Shannon [1994].
The range of Bki (y, g−k) is given by
[
gi
k, ḡki
]
where gki := B
k
i
(
yi, g−k
)
, and ḡki :=
Bki (ȳi, g−k).
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For each public good, we want to characterize the number of voters that would
oppose an increase in its provision. Suppose that for a given level of public good k,
say g̃k, we can find a type ỹi in all groups such that she most prefers that level of
public good, i.e. g̃k = B
k
i (ỹi, g−k) for all i. Then, a separation argument can be
used, as in Gans and Smart [1996], to show that in each group, all individuals with
income higher than ỹi will prefer higher levels of public good k than g̃k, and the
opposite for all those individuals poorer that ỹi. If we find a level ĝk such that half of
the electorate wants less and half wants more, then we will have found a Condorcet
winner for that dimension.
In looking for a Condorcet winner we need to be able to back up the type of the
individuals that most prefer a given level of public good. For this purpose it is useful
to define the following function:
y∗i (g, g−k) :=

ỹi ≥ yi if g = gki = 0,
yi if 0 < g ≤ gki ,(
Bki
)−1
(g, g−k) if g
k
i < g < ḡ
k
i ,
ȳi if ḡ
k
i < g,
where ỹi := sup
{
y : Bki (y, g−k) = 0
}
is the richest individual that prefers a level
of zero for public good k. For g inside the range of Bki (y, g−k), y
∗
i (g, g−k) is the
income of the household in group i that prefers a level g of the kth public good the
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most. For values of g that fall outside the range of Bki (y, g−k), y
∗
i (g, g−k) is set to
equal the bounds of the income support.
Consider the example in Figure 3.1. There we have the bliss point functions over
a public good g for two groups. All individuals from group 1 richer than y∗1 (6) will
vote for g = 6 when paired against any g < 6 , and so will all voters from group 2
richer than y∗2 (6). If it turns out that those individuals richer than y
∗
1 (6) and y
∗
2 (6)
in their respective groups add up to half of the electorate, then g = 6 will have a
majority of votes against any g < 6 from the richer individuals. Similarly, any g > 6
will be defeated by the coalition of voters below y∗1 (6) and y
∗
2 (6) in their respective
groups.
The assumption that Bki (y, g−k) is monotonically increasing is not restrictive and
is easily relaxed. The only important thing is that it must be continuous.
The following proposition shows that a majority-voting equilibrium exists when
voting on each dimension separately8.
8As a final note, I want to point out that the method to find a Condorcet winner described in
this section is not much different than the one described in Epple, Romer, and Sieg [2001]. In their
paper households are characterized by an income y and a value α that describes the intensity of her
preferences towards the unique public good provided by a local government. The two dimensions
of heterogeneity are assumed to be jointly distributed with a pdf f (y, α). Then, they prove that a
bundle (g∗, p∗) is a majority-rule equilibrium in a given community j if we can find ỹj (α)such that:
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Figure 3.1: Bliss point functions for two groups.
Proposition 6. The Condorcet winner when all groups vote on gk holding g−k con-
stant exists and is given by g∗k such that
I∑
i=1
µiFi (y
∗
i (g
∗
k, g−k)) =
1
2
(
I∑
i=1
µi
)
1. (g∗, p∗) satisfies the community’s government budget constraint (GBC),
2. V
(
p∗, g∗, ỹj (α) , α
)
≥ V
(
p, g, ỹj (α) , α
)
for all (p, g) that satisfy the GBC and for all α ∈
[
αj , α
j
]
,
3.
∫ αj
αj
∫ ỹj(α)
yj−1(α)
f (y, α) dydα = 12
∫ αj
αj
∫ yj(α)
yj−1(α)
f (y, α) dydα.
If we consider α being a discrete variable and, consequently, write a sum in place of the outer
integral, we would get a similar expression as the one in this chapter. In that case, ỹj (α) would be
analogous to my y∗i (g
∗) function.
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The next step is to characterize the political equilibrium when individuals vote
on all dimensions. Let Ck (g−k) be the Condorcet winner when vote on the k
th
dimension. A structure induced equilibrium is then defined as a tuple (p∗, g∗1, . . . , g
∗
K)
such that for a given ph
g∗k ∈ Ck
(
g∗−k
)
for all k = 1, . . . , K,
and the city’s budget constraint is satisfied
p∗ = ph +
c (g∗,M)
Hs (ph)
.
Example of voting equilibrium
To see how this might look like consider Figure 3.2. In this example group 1 is
the majority, representing 70% of the electorate. As you can see in the left panel,
basically the entire population of group 2 would like a level of g1 lower that 10. Yet
they are forced to swallow a slightly higher level of that public good since most of
group 1 wants a level higher than g1 = 10. The right panel shows the structure
induced equilibrium. The blue line represents the Condorcet winners for g1 for a
given value of g2. The red line is its counterpart for g2.
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Figure 3.2: Voting Equilibrium.
Note: The left panel shows what happens when voting over g1 holding g2 = 9.99 fixed. The doted line represents a
majority (population is 1). The Condorcet winner for that dimension is found at the intersection of the green line
with the doted line.
The second panel shows the “reaction functions” for the two public goods. The intersection is the structure induced
equilibrium.
Parameters: size of group 1 is 0.7, size of group 2 is 0.2, net-of-tax price is ph = 2.95, α1 = 0.54, α2 = 0.46,
γ1 = γ2 = 0.37, both groups have the same income distribution over [1, 50], c0 = 0, c1 = c2 = 0.5, L = 0.8 , ε = 0.5.
Note that this parameters are in the context of the functional assumptions I make in 3.4.
3.3.2 Equilibrium in the Closed City
In a closed city, all demographic variables are fixed and do not depend on what
happens inside the city.
An equilibrium in the closed city is a tuple (p∗h, g
∗, t∗) such that
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1. Given the income distributions and urban populations of each group {Fi (y) , µi}Ii=1,
the housing market clears
Lh (p∗h) =
G∑
i=1
µi
∫
hi (p
∗, y) fi (y) dy.
2. Given {Fi (y) , µi}Ii=1 and the net-of-tax price of housing p∗h public good levels
are determined by a political equilibrium such that
I∑
i=1
µiFi
(
y∗i
(
g∗k, g
∗
−k
))
=
1
2
(
I∑
i=1
µi
)
for all k = 1, . . . , K.
3. The city’s government runs a balanced budget
c (g∗,M) = t∗p∗hH
s (p∗h) .
3.3.3 The Open City
I now allow people in the economy to decide whether they want to live in the city
or not. This will allow people to vote with their feet and leave the city if they are
unhappy with the chosen policies. The main complication is that now each group’s
urban income distribution will depend on prices and the chosen policies. As was the
case in the previous section, it is necessary to introduce some new notation.
Notation and basic demographic accounting
• N : Population in the economy
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• Ni: Size of the population of group i in the economy
• M : Population in the city
• µi: urban population size of group i
• µi (y): size of type i and income y urban population
• Fmsai (y) , fmsai (y): Income distribution and density in the economy of group i
• Fi (y) , fi (y): Income distribution and density in the city of group i
The income distribution for the urban population of group i can be characterized a
fi (y) =
Pr (cityi | y) fmsai (y)∫ ȳi
yi
Pr (cityi | y) fmsai (y) dy
=
si (y) f
msa
i (y)
si
where Pr (cityi | y) is the probability that an individual from group i with income
y chooses to live in the city, si (y) is the share of the population of group i and income
y that lives in the city, and si =
∫ ȳi
yi
Pr (city | y) fmsai (y) dy is the aggregate urban
share of group i.
The size of the urban population of group i is given by
µi =
∫ ȳi
yi
µi (y) dy
= Ni
∫ ȳi
yi
Pr (city | y) fmsai (y) dy
= siNi
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The size of the city, M , is the sum of the urban populations of all groups
M =
I∑
i=1
µi =
I∑
i=1
∫ ȳi
yi
Pr (cityi | y) fmsai (y) dy =
I∑
i=1
siNi
3.3.4 Spatial equilibrium
To characterize the equilibrium population and demographic composition of the city
we need to introduce a notion of spatial equilibrium that gives us an expression for
Pr (city | y).
The notion of spatial equilibrium that I use in this model is very simple. House-
holds that choose not to live in the city get a reservation utility ūi(y) + εi, where
ūi(y) is known and can be a function of the type of household and its income, and εi
is a random variable representing fluctuations in reservation utility unrelated to the
household related variables.
There is a single, featureless city. By featureless I mean that the city is just the
possibility of consuming a bundle of goods, with no notion of space. One can think of
adding neighborhoods to the city, or a central business district to which households
must commute to get their income. Endowing the model with such features would
permit to study segregation patterns within the city.
In equilibrium, all households of the same type, (i, yi, εi), must get their reserva-
tion utility whether they choose to live in the city or not. If some households were
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receiving more than their reservation utility by living in the city, more households
of that tupe would choose to live in the city driving up housing prices and hence
reducing the utility from living in the city.
Then, the probability that an individual of group i with income y will choose to
live in the city is given by Pr (V ∗i (y) > ūi (y) + εi | y),
Hence, we can write the share of the urban population of type i and income y as
si (y) := Pr (V
∗
i (y) > ūi (y) + εi | y) = Pr (εi < V ∗i (y)− ūi (y) | y)
Integrating over all income levels within the group we get the aggregate share of
urban population for type i (The percentage of type i individuals that choose to live
in the city)
si =
∫ ȳi
yi
si (y) f
msa
i (y) dy
=
∫ ȳi
yi
Pr (εi < V
∗
i (y)− ūi (y) | y) fmsai (y) dy
Finally, multiplying each share by the total population of each type we get the
aggregate urban populations of each type
µi = siNi = Ni
∫ ȳi
yi
Pr (εi < V
∗
i (y)− ūi (y) | y) fmsai (y) dy
This expression does not correspond to a closed form solution for µi since V
∗
i (y)
depends on the type composition of the urban population {µi}Ii=1. The equilibrium
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proportions of each type are implicitly given by the following system of I equations
µi =
∫ ȳi
yi
Pr
(
εi < V
∗
i
(
y | {µi}Ii=1
)
− ūi (y) | y
)
fmsai (y) dy for i = 1, . . . , I
where I write V ∗i
(
y | {µi}Ii=1
)
to emphasize that individual utility from living in
the city depends on the type composition of the population.
3.3.5 Type-I Extreme Value Assumption
Alternatively, we can think of the utility of both living in the city or outside to
include a random shifter. Under the assumption that these shifters come from a
Type-I Extreme Value distribution, we can write the probability that a household of
type i with income y will choose to live in the city as
si (y) = Pr (ūi (y) + ε
o
i < V
∗
i (y) + ε
c
i | y) = Pr (εoi − εci < V ∗i (y)− ūi (y) | y)
=
exp {V ∗i (y)}
exp {V ∗i (y)}+ exp {ūi (y)}
Then, the urban share of group i is given by
si =
∫ ȳi
yi
si (y) f
msa
i (y) dy
=
∫ ȳi
yi
(
exp {V ∗i (y)}
exp {V ∗i (y)}+ exp {ūi (y)}
)
fmsai (y) dy
The total urban population of group i is implicitly given by the system of equa-
tions
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µi = siNi = Ni
∫ ȳi
yi
 exp
{
V ∗i
(
y | {µi}Ii=1
)}
exp
{
V ∗i (y) | {µi}
I
i=1
}
+ exp {ūi (y)}
 fmsai (y) dy for i = 1, . . . , I
3.3.6 Voting in The Open City
When we model the voting process in the open city we need to make a stand on the
level of sophistication of voters. That is, we need to make an assumption on how
they anticipate the changes in prices and demographics that different policies will
imply. One option is that they consider the demographic composition of the city as
fixed, unresponsive to different policies, and that they only take into account changes
in the level of gross prices through the government budget constraint. This is known
in the literature as the “myopic voters” assumption. Alternatively, one can make
the more realistic assumption that voters actually do internalize the demographic
changes that different policies will bring forth. This is known in the literature as the
“utility taking” assumption. The timing assumption made in this model implies that
the population in the city is fixed at the time of voting, which simplifies somewhat
the analysis.
To clarify ideas, let’s look at how the political equilibrium is determined in the
two cases. With myopic voters, both the urban population of each group and their
income distribution is held fixed when the vote is held on each public good. That is,
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(p∗h, g
∗) are determined as the solution to
I∑
i=1
µiFi
(
y∗i
(
g∗k, g
∗
−k
))
=
1
2
(
I∑
i=1
µi
)
for all k = 1, . . . , K
given ph, and {µi, Fi}Ii=1.
Instead, under utility taking, (p∗h, g
∗) are determined as the solution to
I∑
i=1
µi (p
∗
h, g
∗)Fi
(
y∗i
(
g∗k, g
∗
−k
)
; p∗h, g
∗) = 1
2
(
I∑
i=1
µi (p
∗
h, g
∗)
)
for all k = 1, . . . , K
where all demographic objects are responsive to the different policies being con-
sidered.
3.3.7 Equilibrium in the Open City
Putting it all together, we can define an equilibrium in the open city as a tuple of
prices, taxes and public goods (p∗h, t
∗, g∗), and a set of urban shares for each group
{si (y)}Ii=1 such that
1. The housing market clears:
Hs (p∗h) =
I∑
i=1
µi
∫ ȳi
yi
h (p∗, y) fi (y) dy
2. There is a political equilibrium in the city:
I∑
i=1
µiFi
(
y∗i
(
g∗k, g
∗
−k
))
=
1
2
(
I∑
i=1
µi
)
for all k = 1, . . . , K
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3. The city government runs a balanced budget:
c (g∗,M) = t∗p∗hH
s (p∗h)
4. The urban shares for each group and income are given by
si (y) =
exp {Vi (g∗, p∗, y)}
exp {Vi (g∗, p∗, y)}+ exp {ūi (y)}
for i = 1, . . . , I
which implies that the urban income distributions are given by
fi (y) =
si (y) f
msa
i (y)∫ ȳi
yi
si (y) fmsai (y) dy
=
si (y) f
msa
i (y)
si
for i = 1, . . . , I
and the sizes of each group’s urban population are given by
µi = siNi for i = 1, . . . , I
3.4 Numerical Simulation
To get a better sense of the forces at work in the model and of the interaction be-
tween preference heterogeneity and the demographic composition of the city, I assume
functional forms for preferences and technology and solve the model numerically9.
9I only present results for the version of the model with several types. I also solved the model
for a single type, which it turns out is very useful to feed starting values to the full model since it
is solved almost instantly, and they give very similar results when heterogeneity between groups is
very low.
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I then perform some comparative statics exercises. Next I describe the common
environment that I use in these applications.
I assume that there are only two public goods being offered by the city’s govern-
ment and that there are only two groups in the economy. Individual preferences are
given by10
Ui (g1, g2, h, b) =
(
gαi1 g
1−αi
2
)ξi (
hγb1−γ + C
)
.
Note that the groups are different in the parameter αi—the weights that they
give to each public good. Solving the consumer’s problem of optimal consumption
of housing and private good yields the demand functions
hi (y, p) =
γ
p
y and bi (y, p) = (1− γ) y
Plugging these demands into the utility function we get the indirect utility func-
tion
Vi (g1, g2, p, y) =
(
gαi1 g
1−αi
2
)ξi (
γγ (1− γ)1−γ p−γy + C
)
We need C < 0 for these preferences to satisfy single-crossing. To see this,
lets use the fact that a sufficient condition for single-crossing is that the Spence-
Mirrlees condition that marginal rates of substitution (MRS) be increasing in income
10Note that I am assuming that public goods are complementary. This does not need to be
the case; for instance, one could assume that the public good composite is of the CES form:
(
∑
k θkg
ρ
k)
1/ρ
for some 0 < ρ < 1.
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is satisfied.11 An increasing MRS between (gk, p) means that richer individuals are
willing to pay more in housing services in order to consume a given level of public
goods. The MRS is given by
−∂Vi/∂gk
∂Vi/∂p
=
ξiαi
(
γγ (1− γ)1−γ p−γy + C
)
γγ+1 (1− γ)1−γ p−γ−1g1g1−αi2 y
.
Taking its derivative with respect to income we see that
− ξiαiC
γγ+1 (1− γ)1−γ p−γ−1g1g1−αi2 y2
> 0 if and only if C < 0.
I assume that the reservation utility from living in the suburbs is linear and
increasing in income. A justification for this is that it is much easier for richer
households to live outside the city (or move to another city) than it is for poorer
ones. It is given by
ūi (y) = β0 + β1y.
Income for both groups is distributed according to a beta distribution, fmsai ∼
Beta[ai, bi], scaled to span an interval
[
yi, ȳi
]
. I use a beta distribution because it
is bounded—which simplified solving the model—and because it is flexible and can
approximate most commonly used distributions.
11For more details see Gans and Smart [1996]. Note that voters must decide g1, g2 and p (or,
equivalently,t) but that thanks to the budget constraint we can substitute out p. The relevant
single-crossing condition for the theorem in 3.3 to apply is between gk and p, depending on which
dimension k is being decided.
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I assume a linear cost function for the two public goods that does not depend on
the population in the city. None of these assumptions is crucial, and they are easily
relaxed. Hence, the cost of producing g1 and g2 is given by
c (g1, g2) = c0 + c1g1 + c2g2.
Housing supply according to a constant elasticity supply function
Hs (ph) = Lp
ε
h
where L is the land endowment in the city, and ε is the price elasticity.
Before working out the case with the open city I present a comparative static in
the closed city to see how the voting mechanism works.
3.4.1 Comparative Static 1: Changes in Group Shares
For this exercise I consider the population in the city as fixed and I look at how the
equilibrium bundles of public goods changes as we change the relative population
sizes of the two groups.
I consider a city with the following parameters:
γ C ξ β0 β1 α1 α2 c0 c1 c2
0.37 −0.3 0.3 −10 1 0.6 0.4 0 0.5 0.5
Table 3.1: Parameter values for simulation 1.
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Figure 3.3 shows the bliss public good bundles over the (g1, g2) space for both
groups. That is, it plots
gi1 (y) , g
i
2 (y) = arg max
g1,g2
Vi (g1, g2, p, y)
s.t. p = ph +
c (g1, g2)
Hs (ph)
for all y ∈
[
yi, ȳi
]
. Solving this maximization problem for the two groups it is
possible to see that the desired composition of the two public goods is given by
g∗1
g∗2
=
1− αi
αi
c2
c1
which is independent of income. So both groups differ in the desired ratio of
public goods, and richer individuals always want to consume more of both public
goods.
For this exercise I assume that group 2 is on average richer than group 1. This
can be seen in Figure 3.4 where I plot the same bliss points of Figure 3.3 but now
on the (y, gk) space, and the income distributions of the two groups.
Now, if they were voting on the provision of a single public good, we would expect
that as we move the proportion of group 2 individuals from 0 to 1, the provision
would monotonically increase since they are on average richer and, hence, have a
higher demand for public goods. But when we consider the problem of choosing two
public goods we see that this monotonicity need not apply to all goods. For instance,
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Figure 3.3: Bliss points in the (g1, g2) space.
Note: each point represents the bliss point of a household from demographic group g and income y. Points farther
away to the NE represent the bliss points of richer households.
in this example, group two, if left alone, would choose higher levels of both public
goods than group 1 left alone since they are richer on average. Yet as we move the
share of group 2 from zero to one we see that the provision of good 1 decreases first as
the proportions of the two goods adjust gradually towards the preferences of group
2. But it increases later, reflecting the higher demand for both public goods of group
2 relative to group 1.
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Figure 3.4: Cross-section of bliss points for the two public good dimensions.
Note: The shaded plots are the income distributions of the two groups.
3.4.2 Comparative Static 2: Increase in Taste Heterogeneity in the Open
City
This exercise is motivated by Alesina et al. [1999]. Their model predicts that an in-
crease in preference heterogeneity always leads to a decrease in public good provision
and, consequently, in the size of the public sector. The reason is that as the popula-
tion becomes more and more heterogeneous in their desired bundle of public goods,
they would rather have lower taxes and spend the money in private consumption
than see it being spent on stuff they do not like.
Table 3.2 shows the parameters I used for this exercise. There is a clear majority
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in the economy, group 1, who accounts for 80% of the total population. To simplify
I assume both groups have the same income distribution. To begin with, I assume
both groups have the same preferences over public goods, valuing both goods the
same, i,e, αi = 0.5 for i = 1, 2. Then, I gradually create a split between α1 and α2,
symmetrically increasing the former and decreasing the latter.
Not surprisingly, when both groups value both public goods the same, the city’s
government provides them in equal measure. The urban population of group 1 is
larger, but fairly representing their larger share in the economy. Furthermore, both
groups have the same income distribution in the city as they do in the economy.
As both group’s preferences split apart, the majority, i.e. group 1, starts to get
its way in the division of public funds. This can be seen in the actual provision of
public goods moving towards a higher supply good 1 versus good 2. The tax rate
drops as the minority would like to see public spending reduced. An important point
here is that given the parameters I picked, preferences within each group are very
concentrated. By this I mean that voters in each group tend to favor, by and large,
the same policies, and hence tend to vote in block.
So far this is in line with the mechanism described in Alesina et al. [1999] result.
But as preferences move even further apart, the demographic composition of the city
changes, which—by construction—can’t happen in Alesina et al. [1999]. More people
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γ C ξ β0 β1 c0 c1 c2
0.37 −0.3 0.3 −10 1 0 0.5 0.5
Table 3.2: Parameter values for simulation 2.
from group 1 move in, and some people of group 2 move out. As the city becomes
more homogeneous—the majority takes over—the tax rate begins to increase since
households’ valuation of the public bundle increases.
Interestingly, even though the two groups have the same income distribution
at the national level, their urban income distributions gradually split apart as we
increase taste heterogeneity, as can be seen from Figure 3.6. This is due to rich
individuals from the minority leaving the city and taking the outside option—with
the poorer ones stuck in the central city—and rich individuals from the majority
settling in the city as the services it provides become more liking to their taste. This
result is driven by the that richer individuals get a better outside option than poorer
ones.
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Figure 3.5: Effects of an increase in taste heterogeneity.
Note: Metropolitan area population proportions for each demographic group are N1 = 0.8and N2 = 0.2
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Figure 3.6: Evolution of the urban income distributions of the two demographic groups.
Note: as preferences diverge income inequality across groups grows due to rich individuals from the minority leaving
the city and rich individuals from the majority moving into the city. This happens even though income distributions
for the two groups are identical in the metropolitan area.
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
In chapter 2 I have developed an econometric model of the provision of multiple
public goods when voters are heterogeneous in income and belong to different groups
characterized by different preferences over public goods. I use this model to study the
intergenerational conflict in the provision of public goods in large U.S. cities, where
I focus on the provision of three public good categories: public education, basic
public goods and redistribution. Using Census data and Census of Governments
data I show, using a simulated instrumental variables approach, that households
with children, young households without children and older empty nesters do indeed
have conflicting preferences over public good provision. I then estimate a model of
the provision of multiple public goods in order to predict the effect on public good
provision of predicted changes in the demographic structure of cities. I find that
101
provision of public education is likely to fall due to an increase in the shares of
young households without children and older empty nesters, and the effects can vary
substantially from city to city.
In this chapter I have not made an attempt to model the location decision of
households within metropolitan areas. Future work will explicitly model the decisions
of households to locate in the central city of an MSA or in one of their suburbs. The
methods developed in this chapter can also be fruitfully applied to study the ethnic
conflict over the provision of public goods in developing countries.
In chapter 3 I introduce a model of the provision of public goods that can accom-
modate an arbitrary number of public goods and demographic groups with different
preferences over public bundles, and with heterogeneous incomes within groups. The
key assumptions that guarantee an equilibrium are that voting takes place on each
dimension separately (structure induced equilibrium), and that the preferences of
each group satisfy the single crossing condition. Furthermore I embed the political
economy model into a stylized model of location choice between a central city and
its suburbs in order to study the interaction between mobility and demographic het-
erogeneity in the central city. Through a numerical exercise I show that mobility
and demographic conflict interact in a surprising way, generating a non-monotonic
effect between increasing demographic heterogeneity and the size of the public sec-
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tor. When heterogeneity is low, increasing it reduces the size of the public sector,
but it also alters the demographic composition of the city as richer individuals of the
minority group leave for the suburbs and the richer individuals from the majority
move from the suburbs to the city. This leads to a more homogeneous city and to an
inflexion in the support for public spending. Eventually, increases in taste hetero-
geneity lead to increases in public spending per capita, and to a starker segregation
between city and suburbs.
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Group Share and Expenditure Correlations
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Figure A.1: Group share and expenditure correlations.
Note: these scatterplots show the correlations between the share of each group and expenditures per capita in educa-
tion, basic and redistribution.
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A.1 Nonparametric Analysis of Budget Shares
The linear regression design used in the previous section may not capture the full
extent through which group demographic shares may impact the composition of the
budget. Since the budget is decided through a democratic process, it is unlikely that
different interest groups, as reflected by group shares, are going to have a linear effect
on budget shares since the actual political power of each group is going to depend
on the existing group composition.
To allow for nonlinear effects between group shares and the shares of expenditures
I run a fully nonparametric regression of the form
gkc,t = f
(
s2c,t, s
3
c,t
)
+ vc,t
where f is an arbitrary function of the group shares which is estimated using a
Gaussian kernel.
Figure A.2 shows the estimated functions for each of the three budget shares.
In the first panel, representing the budget share for education, we can see a clear
conflict between groups 2 and 3. At any point in the domain, increasing the share
of group 3 decreases the share of spending in education, and the opposite is true
for the share for group 2. The relationship is less clear for basic spending, depicted
the second panel. Here, increasing the share of group 3 decreases the share of basic
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spending when the share of group 2 is also high, but has basically no effect when the
share of group 2 is around its mean value of 0.38. In the case of redistribution, there
is a clear U-shaped relationship between is share and the share of group 2, which
explains why no effect whatsoever is picked up by our regression design.
Nonparametric Regression of Expenditure Shares
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Figure A.2: Nonparametric regressions of education, basic, and redistribution spending on the city demographic
shares of group 2 and group 3.
Note: in all three cases I have used a Gaussian kernel, and the bandwidths have been adjusted to avoid excessive
roughness.
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Table A.1: Simulated Regression Results: Education Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
sh city g2 0.286∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.091 0.409∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.080) (0.078) (0.094) (0.079)
sh city g3 −0.177∗ −0.133 −0.213∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗
(0.091) (0.084) (0.084) (0.104) (0.085)
ethnic −0.125∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ 0.123∗ −0.160∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.036) (0.038) (0.070) (0.035)
r black nh sh 0.093∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗ −0.004 0.415∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.090) (0.030)
r other nh sh 0.413∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.049 0.316∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.078) (0.097) (0.170) (0.077)
gini −0.091 −0.349∗∗∗ −0.297∗∗ −0.0003 −0.278∗∗
(0.114) (0.114) (0.123) (0.153) (0.118)
log(incmed hh nh) −0.105∗∗∗ −0.122∗∗∗ −0.128∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗ −0.072∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.025) (0.029) (0.047) (0.024)
log(Population) −0.054∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.016 0.079∗∗∗ −0.027∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.023) (0.015)
renters sh nh −0.458∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗ −0.445∗∗∗ −0.509∗∗∗ −0.248∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.056) (0.068) (0.144) (0.058)
log(educ col nh) 0.036∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.013 −0.025 0.018
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.027) (0.015)
Total IG Revenue 0.035∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006)
log(ALAND) 0.003
(0.006)
lnb subs −0.008∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.0002 0.001 −0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003)
Constant 1.863∗∗∗
(0.341)
Fixed effects? No Year Year and State City Year and Region
N 478 478 478 478 478
R2 0.418 0.480 0.681 0.843 0.541
Adjusted R2 0.401 0.461 0.641 0.796 0.521
Residual Std. Error 0.060 (df = 464) 0.057 (df = 460) 0.047 (df = 424) 0.035 (df = 366) 0.054 (df = 457)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.109
Table A.2: Simulated Regression Results: Basic Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
sh city g2 −0.206∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗ −0.172∗∗∗ −0.090 −0.143∗∗
(0.051) (0.057) (0.056) (0.078) (0.058)
sh city g3 −0.045 −0.085 −0.091 0.039 0.044
(0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.086) (0.062)
ethnic −0.071∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗ −0.062∗∗ −0.093 −0.077∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.058) (0.025)
r black nh sh 0.032 0.037∗ 0.018 −0.078 0.016
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.075) (0.022)
r other nh sh −0.175∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗ −0.045 0.167 −0.183∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.056) (0.070) (0.141) (0.056)
gini −0.099 −0.046 −0.286∗∗∗ −0.166 −0.209∗∗
(0.078) (0.082) (0.089) (0.127) (0.087)
log(incmed hh nh) 0.038∗∗ 0.027 −0.034 −0.010 0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.039) (0.018)
log(Population) 0.023∗∗ 0.017 −0.006 0.004 0.018∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.011)
renters sh nh 0.102∗∗∗ 0.023 0.021 −0.060 0.123∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.049) (0.119) (0.042)
log(educ col nh) −0.014 −0.003 0.015 −0.036 −0.005
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.022) (0.011)
Total IG Revenue −0.032∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
log(ALAND) 0.009∗∗
(0.004)
lnb subs −0.006∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.004∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002)
Constant −0.313
(0.233)
Fixed effects? No Year Year and State City Year and Region
N 478 478 478 478 478
R2 0.360 0.365 0.608 0.746 0.419
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.342 0.560 0.669 0.393
Residual Std. Error 0.041 (df = 464) 0.041 (df = 460) 0.034 (df = 424) 0.029 (df = 366) 0.039 (df = 457)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.110
Table A.3: Simulated Regression Results: Redistribution Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
sh city g2 −0.029 −0.180∗ −0.031 −0.057 0.014
(0.088) (0.099) (0.084) (0.077) (0.100)
sh city g3 −0.014 −0.056 0.240∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.049
(0.108) (0.104) (0.089) (0.085) (0.107)
ethnic 0.177∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.034 0.213∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.041) (0.057) (0.044)
r black nh sh −0.111∗∗∗ −0.100∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.183∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.074) (0.037)
r other nh sh −0.050 0.090 −0.297∗∗∗ −0.272∗ 0.004
(0.087) (0.096) (0.104) (0.139) (0.097)
gini 0.140 0.294∗∗ 0.681∗∗∗ −0.101 0.433∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.141) (0.131) (0.125) (0.149)
log(incmed hh nh) 0.093∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ −0.001 0.069∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.038) (0.031)
log(Population) 0.054∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗ 0.013
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
renters sh nh 0.133∗∗ −0.001 0.122∗ 0.333∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.063) (0.069) (0.073) (0.118) (0.072)
log(educ col nh) −0.061∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.067∗∗∗ 0.038∗ −0.028
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.022) (0.018)
Total IG Revenue 0.003 0.013∗ 0.001 −0.010 0.033∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
log(ALAND) −0.002
(0.007)
lnb subs 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003)
Constant −1.047∗∗∗
(0.403)
Fixed effects? No Year Year and State City Year and Region
N 478 478 478 478 478
R2 0.157 0.179 0.622 0.891 0.248
Adjusted R2 0.133 0.148 0.575 0.858 0.215
Residual Std. Error 0.071 (df = 464) 0.070 (df = 460) 0.050 (df = 424) 0.029 (df = 366) 0.067 (df = 457)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.111
Table A.4: Simulated IV Results: Education Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ethnic −0.099 −0.209∗∗∗ 0.021 0.127
(0.075) (0.066) (1.009) (0.083)
r black nh sh −0.147 −0.089 −0.781 0.457∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.085) (3.470) (0.112)
r other nh sh −0.463 −0.798∗∗ −3.746 0.148
(0.334) (0.366) (17.828) (0.214)
gini 0.347 −0.713∗∗ −0.365 −0.048
(0.303) (0.281) (1.707) (0.193)
log(incmed hh nh) −0.443∗∗∗ −0.322∗∗∗ −1.154 −0.050
(0.129) (0.091) (4.450) (0.092)
log(Population) −0.290∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ −0.899 0.087∗∗
(0.092) (0.080) (3.452) (0.034)
renters sh nh −0.238∗ 0.522∗∗ 2.025 −0.566∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.254) (9.657) (0.159)
log(educ col nh) 0.293∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.898 −0.041
(0.097) (0.082) (3.464) (0.036)
Total IG Revenue 0.031∗∗∗ −0.017 0.050 0.036∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.015) (0.080) (0.010)
log(ALAND) −0.032
(0.020)
lnb subs 0.003 −0.006 0.040 0.0001
(0.007) (0.006) (0.186) (0.012)
‘sh city g2(fit)‘ 2.730∗∗∗ 2.896∗∗∗ 9.521 0.061
(0.825) (0.802) (37.336) (0.206)
‘sh city g3(fit)‘ 0.432 1.289∗∗ 3.370 0.039
(0.530) (0.544) (10.640) (0.611)
Constant 5.058∗∗∗
(1.367)
Fixed effects? No Year Year and State City
N 448 448 448 448
R2 -0.919 -0.523 -9.954 0.841
Adjusted R2 -0.977 -0.584 -11.302 0.794
Residual Std. Error 0.111 (df = 434) 0.099 (df = 430) 0.276 (df = 398) 0.036 (df = 345)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.112
Table A.5: IV Results: Basic Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ethnic −0.080∗∗ −0.042 0.130 −0.045
(0.038) (0.036) (0.738) (0.067)
r black nh sh 0.145∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ −0.622 −0.085
(0.051) (0.046) (2.539) (0.090)
r other nh sh 0.225 0.335∗ −3.300 0.212
(0.170) (0.198) (13.044) (0.172)
gini −0.374∗∗ 0.037 0.010 −0.240
(0.154) (0.151) (1.249) (0.156)
log(incmed hh nh) 0.195∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ −0.851 0.042
(0.066) (0.049) (3.256) (0.074)
log(Population) 0.112∗∗ 0.100∗∗ −0.621 −0.023
(0.047) (0.043) (2.526) (0.027)
renters sh nh 0.041 −0.309∗∗ 1.723 0.069
(0.069) (0.137) (7.066) (0.128)
log(educ col nh) −0.117∗∗ −0.089∗∗ 0.631 −0.046
(0.049) (0.044) (2.534) (0.029)
Total IG Revenue −0.029∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.002 −0.019∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.058) (0.008)
log(ALAND) 0.029∗∗∗
(0.010)
lnb subs −0.010∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ 0.043 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.136) (0.009)
‘sh city g2(fit)‘ −1.217∗∗∗ −1.266∗∗∗ 6.530 −0.145
(0.420) (0.433) (27.318) (0.166)
‘sh city g3(fit)‘ −0.117 −0.522∗ 1.548 0.265
(0.270) (0.293) (7.785) (0.492)
Constant −1.873∗∗∗
(0.696)
Fixed effects? No Year Year and State City
N 448 448 448 448
R2 -0.259 -0.123 -13.847 0.739
Adjusted R2 -0.297 -0.168 -15.675 0.662
Residual Std. Error 0.056 (df = 434) 0.053 (df = 430) 0.202 (df = 398) 0.029 (df = 345)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.113
Table A.6: Simulated IV Results: Redistribution Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ethnic 0.174∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ −0.260 0.045
(0.057) (0.056) (2.014) (0.070)
r black nh sh −0.061 −0.092 1.632 −0.241∗∗
(0.077) (0.072) (6.926) (0.094)
r other nh sh 0.155 0.303 8.435 −0.334∗
(0.253) (0.309) (35.578) (0.180)
gini 0.249 0.669∗∗∗ 0.401 −0.032
(0.230) (0.237) (3.407) (0.163)
log(incmed hh nh) 0.179∗ 0.151∗ 2.330 −0.037
(0.098) (0.077) (8.881) (0.078)
log(Population) 0.185∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 1.800 −0.042
(0.070) (0.067) (6.889) (0.029)
renters sh nh −0.035 −0.277 −4.766 0.406∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.214) (19.272) (0.134)
log(educ col nh) −0.189∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −1.813 0.029
(0.073) (0.069) (6.912) (0.030)
Total IG Revenue 0.006 0.032∗∗ −0.038 −0.014
(0.009) (0.013) (0.159) (0.009)
log(ALAND) −0.005
(0.015)
lnb subs 0.005 0.012∗∗ −0.109 −0.020∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.371) (0.010)
‘sh city g2(fit)‘ −1.104∗ −1.189∗ −18.679 −0.147
(0.627) (0.677) (74.511) (0.174)
‘sh city g3(fit)‘ −1.032∗∗ −1.290∗∗∗ −5.849 −0.226
(0.403) (0.459) (21.235) (0.514)
Constant −1.552
(1.039)
Fixed effects? No Year Year and State City
N 448 448 448 448
R2 -0.205 -0.181 -46.464 0.878
Adjusted R2 -0.241 -0.228 -52.308 0.841
Residual Std. Error 0.084 (df = 434) 0.084 (df = 430) 0.551 (df = 398) 0.030 (df = 345)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.114
Table A.7: Using MSA Shares as Instruments: Education Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ethnic −0.128∗∗∗ −0.146∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗ 0.111 −0.155∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.086) (0.037)
r black nh sh 0.111∗∗∗ 0.033 −0.029 0.384∗∗∗ 0.051
(0.042) (0.048) (0.053) (0.104) (0.046)
r other nh sh 0.492∗∗∗ 0.019 0.342∗ −0.004 0.226
(0.117) (0.163) (0.190) (0.223) (0.173)
gini −0.114 −0.296∗∗ −0.246 0.055 −0.249
(0.155) (0.133) (0.152) (0.188) (0.157)
log(incmed hh nh) −0.076∗ −0.154∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.139 −0.093∗∗
(0.043) (0.042) (0.056) (0.095) (0.043)
log(Population) −0.028 −0.050∗∗ −0.027 0.094∗∗∗ −0.038∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022)
renters sh nh −0.487∗∗∗ −0.163∗ −0.420∗∗∗ −0.501∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗
(0.059) (0.089) (0.090) (0.157) (0.081)
log(educ col nh) 0.008 0.041∗ 0.024 −0.026 0.029
(0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.044) (0.022)
Total IG Revenue 0.036∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006)
log(ALAND) 0.005
(0.010)
lnb subs −0.008∗∗∗ −0.006∗ 0.002 0.005 −0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003)
‘sh city g2(fit)‘ 0.049 0.736∗∗∗ 0.404 0.023 0.555∗∗
(0.153) (0.235) (0.284) (0.243) (0.239)
‘sh city g3(fit)‘ −0.275 −0.249 −0.296 −0.685∗ −0.212
(0.236) (0.180) (0.196) (0.391) (0.217)
Constant 1.611∗∗∗
(0.544)
Fixed effects? No Year Year and State City Year and Region
N 478 478 478 478 478
R2 0.405 0.466 0.675 0.838 0.536
Adjusted R2 0.388 0.447 0.635 0.788 0.516
Residual Std. Error 0.061 (df = 464) 0.058 (df = 460) 0.047 (df = 424) 0.036 (df = 366) 0.054 (df = 457)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.115
Table A.8: Using MSA Shares as Instruments: Basic Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ethnic −0.076∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗ −0.056∗ −0.047 −0.097∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.073) (0.030)
r black nh sh 0.058∗∗ 0.095∗∗ −0.005 −0.142 0.094∗∗
(0.029) (0.037) (0.038) (0.087) (0.038)
r other nh sh −0.081 0.108 −0.132 0.291 0.162
(0.080) (0.125) (0.137) (0.188) (0.143)
gini −0.175 −0.063 −0.237∗∗ −0.247 −0.344∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.102) (0.110) (0.158) (0.130)
log(incmed hh nh) 0.073∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ −0.061 0.055 0.085∗∗
(0.030) (0.032) (0.041) (0.080) (0.036)
log(Population) 0.036∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.004 0.055∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.023) (0.018)
renters sh nh 0.099∗∗ −0.117∗ 0.041 0.004 −0.011
(0.040) (0.068) (0.065) (0.132) (0.067)
log(educ col nh) −0.032∗∗ −0.034∗∗ 0.024 −0.073∗∗ −0.041∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.037) (0.018)
Total IG Revenue −0.031∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
log(ALAND) 0.015∗∗
(0.007)
lnb subs −0.006∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003)
‘sh city g2(fit)‘ −0.386∗∗∗ −0.668∗∗∗ −0.042 −0.363∗ −0.681∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.180) (0.206) (0.204) (0.197)
‘sh city g3(fit)‘ 0.036 −0.085 −0.177 0.196 0.200
(0.163) (0.138) (0.142) (0.328) (0.179)
Constant −0.699∗
(0.374)
Fixed effects? No Year Year and State City Year and Region
N 478 478 478 478 478
R2 0.335 0.265 0.598 0.730 0.250
Adjusted R2 0.316 0.238 0.548 0.648 0.218
Residual Std. Error 0.042 (df = 464) 0.044 (df = 460) 0.034 (df = 424) 0.030 (df = 366) 0.045 (df = 457)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.116
Table A.9: Using MSA Shares as Instruments: Redistribution Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ethnic 0.197∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.017 0.250∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.046) (0.070) (0.056)
r black nh sh −0.204∗∗∗ −0.211∗∗∗ 0.068 −0.130 −0.102
(0.053) (0.064) (0.060) (0.084) (0.122)
r other nh sh −0.380∗∗ −0.359∗ −0.019 −0.307∗ 0.119
(0.147) (0.215) (0.216) (0.181) (0.575)
gini 0.440∗∗ 0.399∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ −0.091 0.939∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.175) (0.174) (0.152) (0.349)
log(incmed hh nh) −0.031 −0.001 0.278∗∗∗ −0.011 0.116
(0.055) (0.055) (0.064) (0.077) (0.159)
log(Population) 0.018 0.007 0.079∗∗ −0.050∗∗ 0.132
(0.024) (0.027) (0.032) (0.023) (0.152)
renters sh nh 0.122∗ 0.221∗ 0.088 0.293∗∗ −0.333
(0.074) (0.117) (0.102) (0.127) (0.448)
log(educ col nh) −0.010 −0.021 −0.087∗∗∗ 0.059∗ −0.151
(0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.035) (0.154)
Total IG Revenue 0.002 0.009 0.005 −0.007 0.026∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011)
log(ALAND) −0.025∗
(0.013)
lnb subs 0.012∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
‘sh city g2(fit)‘ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.535∗ −0.383 0.131 −0.942
(0.193) (0.309) (0.323) (0.197) (1.479)
‘sh city g3(fit)‘ −0.428 −0.253 0.671∗∗∗ 0.309 −1.428
(0.299) (0.237) (0.223) (0.317) (1.035)
Constant 0.373
(0.687)
Fixed effects? No Year Year and State City Year and Region
N 478 478 478 478 448
R2 0.014 0.041 0.563 0.889 -0.143
Adjusted R2 -0.014 0.005 0.509 0.856 -0.196
Residual Std. Error 0.077 (df = 464) 0.076 (df = 460) 0.053 (df = 424) 0.029 (df = 366) 0.083 (df = 427)
Notes: ∗∗∗Significant at the 1 percent level.
∗∗Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗Significant at the 10 percent level.117
Appendix B
Chapter 2
B.1 Chapter 2: Computation Appendix
Solving the model numerically, I have had difficulties getting third party nonlinear
equation solvers to solve this system directly.12 Instead, what I do is to combine the
equations characterizing the equilibrium into a mapping that maps prices to prices so
that finding the equilibrium is turned into a fixed point problem. To do so, note that
given a net-of-tax price of housing, ph, we can use the second and third equations, i.e.
the equations describing a political equilibrium, to obtain (p∗ (ph) , g
∗
1 (ph) , g
∗
2 (ph)),
where I write ph in parenthesis to indicate that these values depend on the initial
guess of the net-of-tax price of housing.
Given these values, in particular, given p∗ (ph), we can use the housing market
12I used the Python programming language for the numerical exercises in this paper.
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clearing condition to obtain a new value of ph.
In short, if we call H : p → ph the mapping given by housing market clearing,
and P : ph → p the mapping corresponding to the political equilibrium, we want to
find a fixed point of P ◦ H : ph → ph.
Most of the numerical complications come from the need to look for roots of
highly nonlinear and badly behaved functions (and systems).
To solve for the open city equilibrium I do the following:
Fix a tolerance level δ. Enter a given iteration j with a guess for the net-of-tax
price of housing and bundle of public goods
(
p
(j)
h , g
(j)
)
. Then,
1. Use the conditions for a political equilibrium to find g(j+1). That is, solve
I∑
i=1
µi
(
p
(j)
h , g
(j)
)
Fi
(
y∗i
(
g
(j+1)
k ; g
(j+1)
−k
)
, p
(j)
h , g
(j)
)
=
1
2
(
I∑
i=1
µi
(
p
(j)
h , g
(j)
))
for k = 1, . . . , K.
2. Find the implied gross-of-tax price of housing:
p(j+1) = p
(j)
h +
c
(
g(j+1)
)
Hs
(
p
(j)
h
) .
3. Find the new net-of-tax price of housing that clears the housing market. That
is, solve for p
(j+1)
h in
Hs
(
p
(j+1)
h
)
=
I∑
i=1
µi
(
p
(j)
h , g
(j)
)∫ ȳi
yi
h
(
p(j+1), y
)
fi
(
y; p
(j)
h , g
(j)
)
dy.
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4. If
∣∣∣p(j+1)h − p(j)h ∣∣∣ < δ stop. Otherwise, repeat 1-3 starting with a guess (p(j+1)h , g(j+1)).
A couple of observations about this algorithm. First, note that all demographic vari-
ables are held constant through each pass of the equilibrium conditions. This is due
to the myopic voters assumption. Second, nothing guarantees that this algorithm
will converge to a solution. In fact, experimentation shows that under some param-
eterizations, prices tend to blow up. A way to deal with this is to use “dampening”
in each iteration. This is done by setting the new guess of the net-of-tax price as a
weighted average of the value that clears the housing market and the previous guess,
i.e.
p
(j+1)
h = wp̃h + (1− w) p
(j)
h for 0 < w < 1
where p̃h is the price that clears the market in step 3 of the algorithm. Choosing
the right dampening weigh w can also accelerate the convergence of the algorithm
considerably.
Solving the system in point 1 is expensive since every evaluation ...Every evalu-
ation of the equations in point 1 above requires one maximization and finding two
roots for each of the k = 1, . . . , K equations and each of the groups i = 1, . . . , I. The
maximization is to find the bliss point of each public good gk given a price ph, an
120
income y, and a value for the other public goods g−k:
Bik (gk; y, ph) = max
g
Vi (gk, g−k, ph, y)
s.t. p = ph +
c (gk, g−k)
Hs (ph)
Then, when we evaluate y∗i (gk; g−k) we need to find the root of gk−Bik (gk; y, ph).
Given the utility function I assumed in my numerical exercises, the market clear-
ing condition in point 3 is
Lpεh =
1
p
(γ1Ey1 + γ2Ey2)
where Eyi is the mean income of the urban population of group i. Hence, to update
the net-of-tax price in the last step I use
p
(j+1)
h =
(
1
Lp(j+1)
(
γ1 (Ey1)
(j) + γ2 (Ey2)
(j)
)) 1ε
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